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The Limits of Municipal Power
Under Home Rule: A
Role for the Courts
After nearly a century of experience there is continuing
uncertainty about the extent of power conferred upon
municipalities by a grant of home rule. The uncertainty
is at least partially attributable to the failure of many
courts and commentators to separatethe dual functions
of home #ule - as a grantof power to municipalitiesand
as a restriction on the power of the legislature.One consequence of this failure, ProfessorSandalow points out, is
that many authoritieshave incorrectly assumed that the
courts have narrowly limited home rule power. In recent
years there have been proposalsto formulate the grant of
home rule in terms that would deny the courts authority
to limit municipal power and would Test that responsibility solely on the legislature. Professor Sandalow takes
issue with these proposals.After separating the various
powers that might be exercised by home rule municipalities, he presents a searching analysis of the considerations relevant to a determinationof the proper limits of
municipal power and the relative abilities of courts and
legislaturesto impose such limits. He concludes that home
rule provisions should include a broad grant of authority
to legislate at the local level, but that the exercise of this
authority should be subject to limitation by the courts to
protect interests that may be inadequately protected by
local politicalprocesses.

Terrance Sandalow*
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am
indebted to Dean William B. Lockhart and Professor Jesse H. Choper for

their valuable criticisms of portions of this Article; and to the Graduate School
of the University of Minnesota for financial assistance which aided in the
researc
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Thirty years ago, a thoughtful student of municipal government wrote that "the home rule movement appears to be fading
like all fads."' For a time that prediction seemed accurate, but
within the last fifteen years home rule provisions have been written into more state constitutions than during any similar period
since the beginning of the home rule movement in 1875. This resurgence of interest suggests the desirability of a reexamination
of home rule as a device for distributing power between state and
municipal governments. Such a reexamination poses two conceptually distinct but nevertheless related problems: (1) identification of the considerations relevant in determining whether a particular governmental power should be exercised at the state or
municipal level, and (2) determination of the respective roles of the
legislature, the courts, and the municipalities in the process of distributing power between the two levels of government.2 These problems or similar ones have, of course, for many years been the staples
of writing about home rule and, indeed, much of American constitutional law, both state and federal. But the passage of time
brings new problems and, occasionally, fresh insights for dealing
with older ones.
THE MEANING OF HOME RULE
Several years ago the Chicago Home Rule Commission observed that "there is perhaps no term in the literature of political
science or law which is more susceptible to misconception and
variety of meaning than 'home rule.' -8 The confusion is at least
partly attributable to the dual purposes which the phrase has
served, "as both a political symbol and a legal doctrine. ' 4 As a
political symbol "home rule" is generally understood to be synonymous with local autonomy, the freedom of a local unit of
government to pursue self-determined goals without interference
by the legislature or other agencies of state government.' It describes a state or condition- autonomy- generally without
1. McGoLDRicK, LAW AND PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HomE RuLE 1916-

1980, at 3 (1938).
2. A series of decisions by the United States Supreme Court established
that the federal constitution has no voice in these matters. See note 11 inIra.
3.

CHICAGO HOME RULE

COMM'N,

MODERNIZING A

CITY

GOVERNMENT

193

(1954).
4. Ruud, Legislative Jurisdiction of Texas Home Rule Cities, 37 TtxAS
L. REv. 682 (1959).
5. See, e.g., CHICAGO HoME RULE COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 8, at 193-95;
MoTT, HOME RULE FOR AMERICA'S CITIES 6 (Am. Mun. Ass'n Urban Action
Series No. 101, 1949); Ice, Municipal Home Rule in Indiana, 17 IND. L.J. 375

(1942).
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consideration of the means by which the state or condition of
autonomy might be achieved. Since even the most enthusiastic
advocates of local autonomy concede that complete autonomy
is not feasible6 and since a substantial measure of autonomy can
be achieved by a variety of different legal devices, 7 "home rule"
as a political symbol lacks precise meaning because of its failure
to specify either the extent of local autonomy or the manner in
which it is to be achieved.
As a legal doctrine, by contrast, home rule does not describe
the state or condition of local autonomy, but a particular method
for distributing power between state and local governments, i.e.,
a grant of power to -the electorate of a local governmental unit
to frame and adopt a charter of government At the present time
the constitutions of 27 states -28 if Florida's provision for the
municipalities in'Dade County is included -contain provisions
concerning municipal home rule Although these provisions differ
6. See, e.g., MoTrr, op. cit. supra note 5; Walker, Toward a New Theory of
Municipal Home Rue,50 Nw. U.L.REv. 571 passim (1955).
7. These devices are discussed at text accompanying notes 15 &19-24 inra.
8. See FonnDHA,
IwTRODucTiON To AMEPRCAN MUmCWAL ASSOCATION,
MODEL CoNsuTmooAO
OF CHICAGO REP. OF

PRovisiows FOR HoMM RULE 8 (1953); 1940 C=Y
=n LAW DEP'T 12, quoted in CsicAGo Hom Run

Co~vmeq, op. cit. supra note 3,at 194.
9. AT-Asu& CONST. art. X, § 9; Ariz. CONST. art. XII, § ; CAr. CoNsT.
art. XI, § 8; CoLO. CoxsT. art. XX, §§ 1, 6; FsA. CON-ST. art. VIII, § 11; GA.
CoNST. art. XV, cl. 2-8; HAwAI CoNsT. art. VII, § 2; KAN. Coi-sT. art. XII,

§ 5; IA.CoNsT. art XIV, § 40; 31o. CoNsT. art. XI-E,§ 3; Mc. CoNnT. art.
VII, § 21; M xr. CoNsT. art. XI, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. VI, §§ 18(a), 19; NED.
CoisT. artL XI, § 2; NEv. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 8; N.3. CoNsT. art. X, § 4; N.Y.
CoNsT. art. IX, § 16; Omo COwsT. art. XVIII, § 7; OsA.m. CO ST. art. XVI, §
3(a); OR. CoNST. art. X1, § 2; PA. CONST. art. XV, § 1; R. CONsT. amend.

.XVI]I,

§ 2; TENN. CoNsT. art. XI, § 9; Tax. CON T. art. XI, § 5; UTAU

VI, § 39(a);
Wis. CoNST. art. XI, § 3.
Idaho, -whichProfessor Antieau classifies as a home rule jurisdiction, 1
Ar TTusu, Mu rcIpJL CoRPoRATIoN LAW § 3.00, at 95 n.7 (1962). is omitted
CowsT. art. XI, § 5; WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 10; W. VA. CONST. art.

here because its constitution does not grant municipalities the power to frame
and adopt a charter, but only to enact "local police, sanitary and other regulations.. . " IDAHo CowsT. art. XII, § 2. Although the power thus conferred increases local autonomy, the absence of the power to decide upon a

form of government or to enact any but regulatory ordinances without legislative authorization sharply distinguishes Idaho municipalities from municipalities in states that grant true home rule.
Reference should also be made to jurisdictions in which there is statutory
authorization, but not express constitutional recognition, of the power of
municipalities to frame and adopt a charter. See, e.g., IowA CODE §§ 420.280.288 (1962); N.C. GEN. SAT. §§ 160-353 to -363 (1917). Similarities and differences between "statutory" and "constitutional" home rule are discussed
in text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:643

in some degree as to matters of both substance and detail, in general they reflect dissatisfaction with what may be termed the
"common law" of municipal corporations, i.e., the legal relationship of municipalities to the legislature in the absence of any
specific constitutional provisions governing the relationship. To
understand home rule, therefore, we necessarily begin with an
examination of the distribution of governmental power between
state and municipal governments in the absence of home rule.
The power of the legislature with respect to municipal corporations may be derived from the general theory of the position
of the state legislature in American constitutional law. By that
theory, the state legislature is possessed of all legislative power
except as its exercise is prohibited by the federal or state constitutions. 10 In the absence of express constitutional limitations, consequently, the power of the legislature over municipal corporations
is plenary. 1 It has the power to create and the power to destroy; 12
the power to define the form of municipal government" and the
powers and functions which may - or even must - be exercised. 4
10. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self-Government,
16 CoLun'. L. Rnv. 299, 00-03 (1916).
11. A number of -theories limiting legislative power have been urged upon
the courts. Although one or another has occasionally been accepted, none ever
acquired sufficient vitality to warrant extended discussion. Nevertheless, brief
mention of at least the more important of these limiting theories seems
desirable.
(a) The United States Supreme Court has consistently denied municipalities any protection against the state ]egislature under -the federal constitution. City of Newark v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 192 (1923) (equal protection);
City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923) (contract and due process
clauses); see McBAIN, THE LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL HOME
Runs 17-28 (1916).
(b) The doctrine of an "inherent right of local self government," first advanced by Judge Cooley in People ex rel. LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44
(1871), although accepted in a few scattered decisions, has been rejected in
the overwhelming majority of states. Even in those few states in which there
are decisions accepting the doctrine, generally to invalidate legislation interfering with either the selection of local officials by local electors or the socalled proprietary activities of municipalities, its contours have never been
clear. The classic discussion is that in McBain, supra note 10, at 299.
(c) Occasional decisions have held that a municipality is denied due
process of law if it is required by -the legislature to levy a tax or incur a
debt for "purely municipal purposes." Constitutional theory, established
practice, and the weight of judicial authority are to the contrary. See
MeBain, Due Process of Law and the Power of the Legislature To Compel a
Municipal Corporation To Levy a Tax or Incur Debt for a Strictly Local
Purpose,14 CoLTm. L. REv. 407 (1914).
12. 1 ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 1.23, 2.00.

13. 37 Am. Jun. Municipal Corporations§ 82 (1941).
14. 1 ANTIEAU, o. cit. supra note 9, §§ 2.00, 5.01 passim.
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And; of course, what the legislature has given, it may take away.
No grant of authority is beyond recall.
The legislature's absolute power over municipal governments
is not necessarily inconsistent with local autonomy. The very
existence of local government implies a degree of independence.0 5
Moreover, the legislature may exercise its power so as to foster
local autonomy:Thus, in the early years of our history, notwithstanding that in legal theory local units of government were
wholly dependent upon the state legislature and lacked even the
protections which currently appear in many state constitutions,
there was a substantial degree of local autonomy.' It was during
thesecond half of the nineteenth century that state legislatures
across the country established by usage the power which, from
the beginning, they -had in theory. As urban areas increased in
number and population, fed by immigrants from the rural areas
and abroad, governmental activity increased. Public services, such
as water, gas, and transportation were needed and were made
possible by the new technology. Class conflicts intensified. Increasingly, intervention by the state legislature was sought, to
provide new municipal powers, to reverse decisions made at the
local level, or to wrest control from corrupt local officials, frequently in favor of those who were equally corrupt 7 Legislation
descended into regulation of the minutest details of municipal
government. 8
15. See CH CAGo HoM. Riz Coie'x, op. cit. supra note 3, at 197. The

statement in the text should be read as an assertion of fact, not a standard

of constitutional law. The occasional efforts -to employ the mere mention of

municipal corporations in a constitution as the basis for fashioning limitations upon legislative power over such governmental units, e.g, State ex rd.

White v. Barker, 116 Iowa 96, 89 N.W. 204 (1902.), suffer from the same diffi-

culties as -thedoctrine of an inherent right of local self-government. See note
11 supra.

16. See Da TocQunvrmL, DraocRAcy 3n AMERCA 60-100 (Reeves transl.

1858); WooD, SUBURBIA 20-28 (1958).

17. See McBmN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 3-12; WOOD, op. cit. supra note
16, at 28-42.
18. The extent of legislative intervention is indicated in the following

excerpt from REPORT OF THE CoimussIoN To DsVIsE APLN or Goim-. NmTr
FOR TnE Crms OF Nnw Yom (1877), quoted in McBAur, op. cit. supra note

11, at 9:
Cities were compelled by the legislature -to buy lands for parks and
places because the owners wished to sell them; compelled to grade,
pave, and sewer streets without inhabitants, and for no other purpose
than 'to award corrupt contracts for the work. Cities were compelled
to purchase at the public expense and at extravagant prices, the property necessary for streets and avenues, useless for any other purpose
than to make a market for the adjoining property then improved. Laws
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In due course, a reaction set in. Local governments- more
accurately, some of their citizens- sought, and frequently developed sufficient political strength to obtain, constitutional recognition of areas of assured local autonomy. Analysis suggests that,
broadly speaking, constitutional provisions increasing local independence might have modified the "common law" of municipal
corporations in either of two ways: (1) by granting municipalities
the authority to exercise certain powers without prior authorization from the legislature, or (2) by limiting the legislature's power
to legislate concerning municipal government. During the second
half of the nineteenth century, constitutional provisions of the
latter type were frequently written into state constitutions. Legislatures were prohibited from interfering with the local selection
of local officials, appointing commissions to supervise or interfere
with local government, levying taxes for local purposes or requiring local governments to do so, or interfering with local control
of streets.19
With the possible exception of home rule, the most pervasive
of the limitations upon the power of the legislature written into
state constitutions during this period were the prohibitions of
special or local legislation. 0 In the absence of such prohibitions,
the plenary power of the legislature over municipal corporations
permitted the enactment of legislation directed at particular situations, thus enabling the legislature to intervene in local affairs
without the necessity of concerning itself with general implications, as would have been required if the legislation were of a
more general nature. Further, the legislature's power to enact
legislation applicable only to a single city deprived the city of
were enacted abolishing one office and creating another with the same
duties, in order to transfer official emoluments from one man to another; and laws to change the function of officers with a view only to
a new distribution of patronage, and to lengthen the terms of offices,
for no other purpose than to retain in place officers who could not
otherwise be elected or appointed.
19. See I ATmAu, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 2.07-.10, .14; STAsoN &
KAurER, MuNIcniAx CoR'oATIONS R5-28 (3d ed. 1959); Wnimts, STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

ON SOLUTIONS OF IMETROPOLITAN

AREA.Pno-

LEMS (1961).
20. See 1 DILLON, MuNic'AL CORPORATIONS §§ 140-75 (5th ed. 1911);
Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw. UJL. REv. 279 (1962). Initially, such provisions appear to have been part of a general legislative reform aimed at requiring the legislature to concern itself more with general
policy and less with detail. The potential importance of the provisions as a
means of increasing local autonomy was, however, soon recognized. See
McBAn, op. cit. supra note 11, at 64-106.
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the normal political safeguards of statewide interest in the legislation; none-but the residents of a single city would have any
interest in such legislation and they frequently lacked sufficient
political influence to prevent the interference.21 As a device to increase local autonomy, the primary utility of bans upon local
legislation, if effective, is to decrease the opportunity for legislative intervention in matters of local interest. True, the legislature
might, quite consistently with the spirit of such provisions, "regulate-in superabundant detail many minute operations"-" of municipal government, but at least some detail must be eliminated. A
legislature could not, for example, require the purchase of a particular parcel of land or the entry into a particular contract without descending into flagrantly special legislation. 3
Each of the constitutional provisions discussed thus far tends
to increase local autonomy by limiting the power of the legislature. There remains the possibility, as suggested above, of increasing local autonony by a quite different method: permitting
municipalities to exercise certain powers without prior authorization from the legislature.F4 In a period of marked social and eco21. The problem of local legislation is discussed further at text accompanying notes 46-53 infra.
22. McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 11, at 97.

23. For this reason an effective prohibition of special legislation has frequently been considered an indispensable element of home rule. See, e.g.,
CHICAco HoAm RuLB Cox 'N, op. cit. supra note 3, at 205; MoTr, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 6. Professor McBain, in his influential work on home rule,
stated:
It is idle to discuss whether home rule charters should be made "subject to" laws of special application that deal with special matters of
local concern. The establishment of such a relationship between the
self-competence of the city and the superior competence of the legislature would be little short of ridiculous. It would rob the grant of
home rule of its entire substance.
McBAw, op. cit. supra note 11, at 677. Yet, as succeeding paragraphs demonstrate, a grant of home rule powers effects an important change in the legal
relationships of city and state whether or not the power of the legislature to
interfere in local affairs is limited. An effective prohibition of special legislation may serve to increase local autonomy, but its absence is not inconsistent
with home rule. Thus, in Minnesota, the pre-1958 constitutional prohibition
of local legislation did not substantially interfere with the power of the legislature to enact local legislation. Note, Home Rule and Special Legislation in
Minnesota, 47 T&Nx. L. Ptv. 621, 636-37 (1963). Yet, as even the Chicago
Home Rule Commission observed, the grant of home rule powers did result
in a substantial increase in the autonomy of Minnesota municipalities. CmcAGo Hovm RuLB Com.'N, op. cit. supranote 3, at 213-14.
24. In theory, an effective prohibition upon local legislation might have
had an important secondary effect. The difficulty of framing detailed legislation applicable to a large number of municipalities facing an almost infinite
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nomic change, with a seemingly ever increasing need for governmental regulation and service, the necessity of seeking legislative
authorization for each new endeavor is an important limitation
on municipal independence. 5 Yet, under the "common law" of
municipal corporations a grant of authority from the legislature
is essential. "All acts beyond the scope of the power granted are
void."2 The reversal of this doctrine was the distinctive contribution of home rule. At least with respect to what are usually termed
matters of local or municipal concern, municipalities are, under
a grant of home rule, empowered to exercise the initiative - to
assume new power and functions without first seeking leave of
27
the legislature.
The power of a municipality to frame and adopt a charter
might also be understood as limiting the power of the legislature
to enact laws with respect to municipal governments. In some jurisdictions this has been a consequence of the grant of home rule to
municipalities?" Careful analysis requires, however, that the two
functions of home rule be recognized as distinct. A decision as to
whether certain matters ought to be within the initiative power of
municipalities involves considerations quite different from a decivariety of problems might have led to the enactment of broad grants of
authority to municipalities, vesting in local officials or the local citizenry a
large measure of discretion to determine the form of municipal government
and its powers and functions. See AikAmA LEaIsATIVn REFERENCE SRVICE,
MEMORANDUM TO THE LEGISIATIVE COUNCIL OF AAnAMA Iq RE HoME RULE
VERsus LOCAL LEGISLATION 6 (1948). To some extent prohibition of local legis-

lation does appear to have had such an effect. Thus, the year following the
adoption of a constitutional ban upon local legislation, the Iowa legislature
granted existing municipalities, which had been incorporated by special acts,
the power to amend their own charters. See McBArn, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 81-85. "Optional charter" legislation has also been employed by a number of legislatures as a device for achieving flexibility in the face of prohibitions of special legislation. See FoRuHAm, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 78-74
(1949).
25. See text accompanying notes 34-62 infra.
26. 1 DmLoN, op. cit. supra note 20, at 450.
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily

or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation, - not simply convenient, but indispensable.
Id. at 448-49.
27. Qualification is necessary in those jurisdictions in which the constitution empowers the legislature to define the area of municipal home rule. See
text accompanying notes 99-108 infra.
28. See Fordham, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 OHIO ST.
LJ. 18 (1948).

HOME RULE
sion as to whether such matters ought to be beyond the competence
of the legislature.-9 Moreover, failure to keep the distinction between the two aspects of home rule dearly in view has resulted
in considerable confusion as to the extent to which correctives
are needed for present home rule doctrines. A single example will
suffice. Section 804 of the 1948 Revision of the National Municipal League's Model State Constitutiongrants "each ciy . . . full

power and authority to pass laws and ordinances relating to its
local affairs, property and government..

..

The section pro-

vides, however, that "this grant of authority shall not be deemed
to limit or restrict the power of the legislature to enact laws of
statewide concern uniformly applicable to every city "'3 Phrases
such as 'local affairs, property and government" and "statewide
concern" are, of course, not self-defining. To eliminate uncertainty, at least partially, and to minimize the possibility of judicial interpretations restrictive of municipal power,31 the draftsman included in the section an enumeration of "a part of the
powers conferred upon cities ...

"No

similar content was given

to the phrase "statewide concern," which marked the boundaries
29. See discussion at text accompanying note 90 infra.
30. Section 804 contains several ambiguities concerning the extent to
which limitations have been placed upon the power of the legislature. The
first paragraph of the section provides, as stated in the text, that the grant
of authority to cities "shall not be deemed to limit or restrict the power of
the legislature to enact laws of statewide concern uniformly applicable to
every city." This language appears to place two distinct limitations upon
legislative powers: (1) the legislature may legislate only with respect to
subjects that are "of statewide concern" and (2) when legislating on such
subjects, its enactment must be uniformly applicable to every city. Curiously,
the very next sentence appears to contradict this conclusion. It states
that "the following shall be deemed to be a part of the powers conferred upon
cities by this section when not inconsistent with general law," suggesting
that quite apart from the subject matter of legislation, it supersedes municipal regulations if it is "general." See LrrTLwmm, ] r orrTAx AnEA PeonMumciPAL Homm RurE 71-72 (1962).
L ms AxD
Moreover, a requirement that legislation be "general" has never been
understood as meaning that it be "uniformly applicable to every city," thus
precluding classification. The confusion is compounded by the fact -that the
provision appears to have been borrowed, with some modifications, from
Wis. CoNsT. art. XI, § 8, which subjects the exercise of home rule powers
"to such enactments of the legislature of state-wide concern as shall with
uniformity affect every city . . . " The Wisconsin Supreme Court has, however, interpreted this provision as not precluding classification. Van Gilder
v. City of ladison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1936).
Professor Bromages explanatory article indicates that the interpretation
adopted in the text corresponds -to the intended meaning. NATIONA, MUmicrPAL LmAGuE, MODEL STATE CONSTrIUTioN 45, 46-47 (5th ed. 1948).

Si. Ibid.
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of the legislature's power. Yet, a review of judicial decisions concerning home rule, with the distinction between its function as a
grant of municipal power and its function as a limitation on the
legislature's power kept clearly in mind, plainly establishes that
to achieve the League's stated goal, enumeration of the areas
deemed not to be of statewide concern would have been far more
meaningful than enumeration of subjects intended to be included
within the initiative power of municipalities. Judicially imposed
limitations on the initiative power, i.e., invalidations of the exercise of power by a home rule municipality in the absence of conflicting state legislation, have been relatively infrequent and of
minor importance in undermining local autonomy.82 The more
difficult problem for the courts, and hence the problem more productive of confusion in the reported decisions, has been that of
determining whether state legislation shall prevail over a home
rule charter or an ordinance enacted pursuant thereto when the
two are in conflict.3" It is the doctrines developed in resolving
this problem which have caused home rule to be a disappointment
to advocates of substantial local autonomy.
THE ARGUMENT FOR A BROAD GRANT OF
MUNICIPAL INITIATIVE
Almost without exception, modern students of municipal affairs have urged the desirability of a broad grant of municipal
initiative through the mechanism of home rule. 4 The virtual
unanimity with which they have arrived at this conclusion reflects,
in part, rejection of the distrust of municipal government which has
traditionally marked American politics"6 and which is embodied in
Dillon's rule;36 in part, it also reflects a consensus that alternative
32. See text accompanying notes 77-170 infra.
s. The term "conflict" is employed in a broad sense to include not only
an actual collision between state legislation -and local charters or ordinances
but also preemption by the former.
34. See, e.g., AAmicAN MUNIcIPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PRioVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL Hoacm RULE (1953); COMM'N ON INTERaOVEIRNMENTAL RELATIONS, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRANSMITTAL TO
CONGRESS

49-50 (1955); MOTT, op. cit. supra note 5, at 18; NATIONAL MU-

NIcIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION

art. VIII (6th ed. 1963); of.

Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of Governmental
Powers, in AREA AND POWER 27 (Maass ed. 1959).
85. "The abuse by local government of broad powers troubles the Commission minimally. It is not currently widespread in any serious way." U.S.
ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTIONAL,
AND PERSONNEL POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMNT 72 (1962).

36. See note 26 supra.
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methods of providing municipal powers are unsatisfactory.
The "common law" doctrine that municipalities may exercise
only those powers authorized by the state legislature has, in practice, required frequent trips to the state capitol by municipal
officials. To some extent the necessity of legislative authorization has been mitigated by broad delegations of power, a practice
increasingly common in recent years, but the danger of narrow
construction of delegated .powers by the courts3 7 has made local
officials understandably reluctant to risk assertion of new powers
without rather clear statutory authorization3 8 Frequently, the
absence of clear authority involves relatively, minor matters:
whether, for example, the municipality has power to prohibit the
use.of roller skates, bicycles, and scooters on sidewalks, to require
installation of reflectors on the rear of automobiles, or to sell
peanuts at a municipally owned pier 3 Lack of authority concerning any one of these minor matters may not seriously hamper
municipal government, but frequent repetition of the same theme
constitutes a substantial impediment to effective day-to-day operations. The _problem is more acute when the municipality lacks
power to undertake a program designed to meet an important
new problem. Chicago, for example, has at times in the past been
unable to regulate various occupations and businesses vitally
affecting the welfare of its residents40 or to license automobile
37. Statement of Dillon's rule is frequently accompanied by a subsidiary
proposition that "where there is any fair, substantial, or reasonable doubt
whether a particular power is possessed by a municipal corporation the existence of the power in question must be denied." Law v. Phillips, 136 W. Va. 761,
779, 68 S.E.2d 452, 462 (1952). Although frequently attributed to Judge Dillon,
the proposition as thus stated substantially modifies his position. See note 273

infra.
Commentators have often criticized the subsidiary proposition as well as
other rules of construction at times employed by the courts to determine
the existence vel non of authority claimed by a municipality. See, e.g., Walker,
supra note 6, at 577-78, 583. Such criticism frequently overestimates the
importance of constructional rules in guiding judicial decision. E.g., compare
Nasfell v. Ogden City, 122 Utah 344, 346, 249 P-ad 507, 508 (1952), with
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 Pad 1191 (1937).
See generally Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Apppdlate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are To Be Construed, 3 VA.N,. L.

REv. 395 (1950).
38. See LEPAWSKY, Holm RuLE FOR MEOPOLITAN CHICAGO XV (1935);
SEcTIOan OF LOCAL. Gov m-sNT LAw OF TnE ABA, AwhruAL REPoRT
OF Ho M R= Cornnm=, reprinted in LoCAL GovEwum -raTLAw Smavics
LE= 27, 30 (Supp. Nov. 1962).
39. See LEP.-wsKY, op. cit. supra note 38, at xiii; NEVADA LEGisLATIv
CouNsSL BuaExu, Hoam RuE IN NEVADA 28-29 (Bull. No. 15, 1952).

cf. 1962

40.

HODES, LAW AND THE MODERN CIT

33-51

(1937).
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operators 4 ' even though the legislature had provided no system
of state-wide control to protect the public. As experience or new
problems indicate the need for additional powers, municipal officials may, of course, obtain necessary authorization from the
legislature. Often there is little difficulty in obtaining the legislature's cooperation.4 Nevertheless, municipal dependence upon
the legislature for new powers has proven unsatisfactory, at least
in the absence of a broad delegation approximating the breadth
of municipal initiative granted by home rule.
The task of obtaining authorizing legislation may be most
difficult for the municipality when the legislature is restricted by
an effective prohibition of local legislation. Although the authorization may eventually be forthcoming, the necessity of drawing
legislation generally applicable throughout the state means that
enactment may have to await crystallization of opinion on a statewide basis. 3 Since the pace at which problems develop is not
likely to be even throughout the state, there may be considerable
delay between the time when one municipality needs power and
the time when general legislation is politically feasible.44 Often,
too, the strength of the opposition to the municipality's proposal
may be increased by the required application of the legislation to
45
areas where the problem is less acute or, perhaps, non-existent.
The need for flexibility in handling municipal problems has led,
in most jurisdictions, to a substantial watering down of constitutional provisions prohibiting special legislation. Although the
availability of effective local legislation eliminates the problems
created by constitutional efforts to force all municipalities into a
single mold, or at best a limited number of molds, it raises 40other
problems. Pressure from municipalities for local legislation es41. LEPAWSKY, op. cit. supra note 88, at 18-19.

42. The Report of the Chicago Home Rule Commission concludes, for
example, -that Chicago has usually been able to obtain authorization for new
police powers or provision of new services. CricAGo HomE RULF COMM'N,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 265, 283.
48. See U.S. ADvisoRY CoM''N ON IXTERGOVERNmNTAL RELATIONS, op.
cit. supra note 85, at 72.

44. See City of McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451, 109 Pac. 81
(1910). The necessity of obtaining state-wide support for such legislation
may, of course, constitute an important safeguard to political minorities in

the municipality or others who may be adversely affected by exercise of the
desired power. See text accompanying notes 191-293 infra.

45. Opposition to the legislation is not likely to be blunted by the fact
that it merely authorizes and does not require municipal action, since it is
obviously to the advantage of opponents of the municipality's program to

make their fight in both forums.
46. Legislatures were not long in learning that constitutional provisions
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tablishes precedent, both in the legislature and the courts, for
local legislation which may not be desired by the municipality,"T
thus returning full circle to the very problems which the constitutional provisions were designed to eliminate. In addition, technical problems are created by the necessity of phrasing the legislation in general terms even though it is intended to be only local
in effect: The passage of years may result in loss of the characteristics by which the municipality that was intended to receive the
power was defined. 48
There are, however, more fundamental objections to a system
whereby municipalities are dependent upon the legislature for
authorization of each new power. Probably the primary motivation for the development of constitutional bans upon special legislation was the drain on the -legislature's time resulting from
consideration of purely local measures 9 If the legislature adequately performs.its duty, engaging in careful deliberation of the
proposed local measures, the expenditure of time required will
almost necessarily divert the legislators from their most important function and the one for which they are best equipped, formulation of state-wide policy. Control of municipal power, moreover, is vested primarily in representatives who are neither informed concerning the problems of the municipality nor responsible to its residents. 0 Dependence on the legislature for new powers may also result in weakening the municipality's bargaining
position in the legislature. The price exacted for authorization by
legislators without direct responsibility to the municipality may
be abandonment by the municipality of other state legislation in
which it has an interest"
mandating general legislation might be evaded by the simple expedient of
classifying municipalities by population or other characteristics. So long as
the classification is supportable on some reasonable ground, the technique has
generally withstood challenge. Indeed, classification has frequently withstood
attack even where it is patently designed to achieve only individualized
treatment for a particular municipality which is not, so far as the subject
of the legislation is concerned, meaningfully different from other municipalities. See generally Winters, supra note 20.
47. The problem may be mitigated by permitting the legislature to enact
local legislation if it has the consent of the affected municipality. See, e.g.,
Mncw. CoNsT. art. XI, § 2; N.Y. CONST. art. X, § 11.

48. See LEpAwS=, op. cit. aupranote 38, at 140; Note, 47 M]Nu.
621, 638 (1963).

L. REv.

49. See note 20 supra.
50. See Fordham, The West Virginia Municipal Home Rule Proposal, 38
W. VA. L.Q. M, 289-41 (1932).
51. It was, for example, widely rumored that the price paid by Chicago
for authority to reorganize its police department after the recent scandal was
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Most frequently, however, strictly local measures are not carefully deliberated in the legislature. Legislators are guided almost
entirely by the local delegation.5 2 While the controlling weight
given to the views of the local delegation tends to mitigate the problems of unfamiliarity with local issues and lack of responsibility to
the local electorate, it by no means eliminates them. The local delegation to the legislature is often elected on the basis of state issues.,,
More importantly, it is not charged with the day-to-day operation
of municipal government, in consequence of which it is less likely
than municipal officials to be intimately familiar with the problem involved. The difficulty is accentuated when the local delegation is of a different political party than the one in control of the
municipal government. Under such circumstances it may owe its
election to the very groups opposing the action proposed by the
municipality.
Uncertainty as to the extent of municipal power may also lead
to what one commentator has termed "municipal pussyfooting."' 4
Officials not only hesitate to embark upon new programs, but at
times employ the confusion created by joint legislative-municipal
responsibility as a pretext for failing to take action. The buck can
be passed to the legislature for failing to provide the necessary
authority, while the legislature, in turn, can remain indifferent or,
frequently with some justification, argue that the municipality already has sufficient power. A broad grant of municipal initiative,
by contrast, serves to promote the visibility of governmental
decision making by pin-pointing responsibility. 55
Ultimately, the argument for a broad grant of municipal initiative rests upon the desirability of permitting municipalities to
govern generally, rather than limiting them to the exercise of particular functions. A system under which municipalities are generally dependent upon legislative delegation of power is based
upon the tacit assumption that there are numerous areas of governmental activity which are the exclusive concern of other levels
abandonment of state-wide fair employment or fair housing legislation. Chi-

cago Daily News, April 15, 1961, p. 5, col. 1.
52. See FoRDII m, LOCAL GOVERNM-NNT LAW 75 (1949); McBAIN, op. Cit.
upra note 11, at 67; NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, SURVEY OF THE
FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICES, DEPARTMENTS, INSTITUTIONS, AND AGENCIES OF
THE STATE OF NEVADA AND WHAT THEY COST (Bull. No. 1, 1947), quoted in

NEVADA LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, op. cit. supra note 39, at 19; Fordham, supra note 50, at 239-41.
53. MoTr, op. cit. supra note 5, at 13.
54. LEPAWSKY, op. cit. supra note 38, at xv.
55. U.S. ADVISORY COIASM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, Op. Cit.
supra note 35, at 72.
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of government.5 6 On that assumption, restricting municipalities

to the exercise of power granted by the legislature serves the useful purpose of protecting other levels of government against
municipal encroachment. The assumption, however, is invalid as
either a description of municipal activity or a statement of desirable policy. Municipal government touches virtually every
aspect of urban life. Instead of a division of function among the
various levels of government, responsibility for the entire range of
governmental functions has been shared among municipal, state,
and (to a somewhat lesser degree) federal governments. There is,
moreover, growing consensus that traditional assumptions limiting the sphere of municipal activity are not suited to current
conditions.
The semantics and legal fictions of exclusive allocations of powers do
not accord with the "seamless web" of governmental operations in
our times. They suggest boundaries where there are no boundaries,
absolute distinctions where there are only relative ones....
And more, if governmental action at each level is to be well conceived and effective; if the citizen is -to be drawn as a whole person into
particiption... and if the system 6f countervailing power is to have
any meaning or vitality, then the concerns and the decisions which the
component area can legitimately undertake ought to embrace the whole
range of matters
assigned to the governmental process by that society
7
in its time.

Further, municipal power to govern generally - to deal with "the
whole range of matters assigned to the governmental process" is necessary to the establishment of a rational system of priorities.
Effective choice among the competing demands upon government
is meaningful only when a full range of alternatives is available."5
The fragmentation of governmental power implicit in municipal
dependence upon delegated powers seriously curtails such choice
by withholding alternatives.P9
Since a broad grant of municipal initiative does not imply any
56. The assumption that municipalities have limited functions is implicit
in the frequent statement that they are established "chiefly to regulate and
administer the local and internal affairs of the city, town, or district which
is incorporated," implying that there are governmental affairs which are not
"local and internal" and hence beyond the province of local government. See,
e.g., 1 DnmoN, op. cit. =upranote 20, §§ 31-33; 1 Yom=, Mu~mciwA CoaRoRATIONS § 5 (1956).

57. Ylvisaker, stqnra note 84, at 35.
58. Ibid. See also GuLIcK, TEE METROPOLITArr
IDEAS 82-84 (1962).

Pa0La

AND Aamtrc

59. Municipal power to govern generally does not, however, require a
grant of municipal power coextensive with the power of the legislature. See
text accompanying notes 221-93 infra.
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limitation on the power of the legislature, 0° there is always the possibility that the legislature may interfere with the exercise of local
power either by denying it or by hemming it in with restrictions.
While this danger (or safeguard) exists, it is generally recognized
that "it is easier to block a legislature from denying a power than
it is to secure from a legislature the authority to perform an additional function of government."' 1 In any event, under a broad
grant of initiative, municipalities would, presumably, assume that
they had the power to act. 2 And so would their citizens. At least
in the first instance, the formulation of plans for coping with
new problems, or of devising better solutions for older ones, is,
under a general grant of home rule power, placed squarely upon
those most familiar with local problems and directly responsible
to the local citizenry.
THE INITIATIVE IN THE COURTS
The Ambiguity of the Constitutional Provion
The distinctive contribution of the home rule concept, as suggested above, was the grant of authority to municipalities to exercise governmental power without prior authorization by the
legislature. So radical a departure from prevailing legal relationships, it might be expected, would have led the framers of home
rule provisions to attempt to define with some care the areas in
which the initiative was granted. Did the constitutional authorization provide power only to define the organization and procedures of local government, or did it also authorize the exercise
of substantive powers? If the latter was intended, were municipalities to be free to enact any legislation which was within the
competence of the state legislature, or was municipal initiative
more limited? If it was more limited, to what subjects did it
extend?
The language of constitutional home rule provisions provides
remarkably little guidance concerning these questions0 3 Virtually
60. See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
61. NATIoNAL MvumciPAx LFAGUE, op. cit. supra note 84, at 07.

62. But 8ee HAGENSIC, MUNICIPAL HomE RUIX iN WIScoNsiN 14 (1061),
reporting that in spite of a very liberal grant of municipal initiative in Wisconsin, "municipalities are often reluctant to assume new powers without
specific [statutory] authorization." The practice is attributed to "an inbred
attitude of municipal officials who psychologically accept the notion that the
municipality is but a creature of the state."
63. The lack of clarity in the language employed was, of course, only
symptomatic of the uncertainty surrounding the significance of the new technique for distributing power between state and municipality. See Schmandt,

1964]

1HOME RULE

all of the provisions state that a municipality may frame and
adopt a "charter for its own government" or "a home rule charter," or employ somewhat similar language. Nearly half contain
no further definition of the powers granted to municipalities. An
eflort to determine the scope of home rule power from such language involves considerable difficulty. Except in the context of
home rule, the phrase "municipal charter" is generally understood
as signifying "the creative act setting up the corporation, whether
the act, be general or special, together with all other laws, both
statutory and constitutional, relating to the corporation and its
rights, duties, powers, privileges, etc."8 4 To draw on this meaning
in defining the term "charter" when it appears in a constitutional
home rule provision might suggest that authorization to frame
and adopt a charter permits a municipality to enact any laws
within the competence of the state legislature. 5 Such a conclusion, however, runs contrary to the common understanding that
such general subjects as crime, domestic relations, wills and administration, mortgages; trusts, contracts, real and personal property,-insurance, banldng, corporations, and many others are not
appropriate subjects for local control.PO There are, moreover,
weighty policy considerations which militate against granting
municipalities initiative power coextensive with the competence
of the legislature.P7
_ The grant of charter-making authority might be read more
narrowly as authorizing municipalities to provide in their charters for only the exercise of such powers as might be delegated
by-the legislature to a non-home rule municipality. 8 But this
Municipal Home Rule in Missouri, 1953 WASH. UJL.Q. 385, 387; Walker,
Municipal Government in Ohio Before 1912, 9 Omo ST.LJ.1, 13-16 (1948).
64. STASON & KYupra, op. cit. supra note 19, at 105; see City of St.
Petersburg v. English, 54 Fla. 585, 596, 45 So. 483, 487 (1907); People v.

Briggs, 50 N.Y. 553, 559 (1872). The phrase is occasionally used in a more
restricted sense, referring only to the creative act establishing the municipality. See 2 McQunvN, M

imcPAT.CoRpoRtATioNS § 9.02 (3d ed. 1949).

65. The sixth edition of the National Municipal League's Model State
Constitution expressly adopts this formulation. NATIoNAL MuICIPAL LAGJuE,
op. cit. supranote 34, at 98-100. See text accompanying notes 173-81 &187-90
infra.
.66. McBsi, op. cit. msgra note 11, at 673-74.
67. See text accompanying notes 171-293 infra.

68. There is dicta adopting this construction. See, e.g., Platt v. San
Fancisco, 158 Cal. 74, 82, 110 Pac. 304, 807 (1910); City of McMinnville v.
Howenstine, 56 Ore: 451, 456, 109 Pac. 81, 83 (1910). This approach has,
moreover, been expressly adopted in the Model Contitutional Provirions for
Municpal Home Rule prepared by Dean Fordiamn for the American Munici-

pal Association. See text accompanying note 172 infra.
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formulation merely restates the problem of determining the meaning of a grant of charter-making authority without substantially
aiding its resolution. It does, of course, make clear that authorization to frame a charter permits the exercise of some substantive
powers, but it implies a limitation on the exercise of such powers
without providing any guidance as to the nature of the limitation.
It is commonly stated that the legislature may properly delegate
"all power incidental to municipal government," or "appropriate
to the orderly conduct of municipal affairs," or which "relates to
a matter of local self-government."6 9 The absence of a constitutional tradition which would give content to these phrases deprives them of utility in defining the scope of initiative under
home rule.70
In more than half of the constitutional home rule provisions,
some effort is made to further define the scope of municipal initiative. The language employed, however, is barely more instructive
than that already discussed. Municipalities are, for example, authorized to enact laws or regulations "in respect to municipal
affairs"; 71 concerning their "organization, government, or affairs"; 72 "relating to [their] property, affairs or government"; 78
or to "adopt and enforce within their limits ... local police, sanitary and other similar regulations. '7 4 For better or worse,7 the
use of such phrases constitutes a clear invitation to policy making
by judges before whom, in our system of government, all questions as to whether
a municipality has exceeded its power must
76
inevitably come.
69. 2 McQuinmx, op. cit. supra note 64, § 9.04, at 473; RuYNE, MuNIcPAL
LAW 73

(1957).

70. For further criticism of such -a formulation of the scope of municipal
initiative, see text accompanying notes 178-90 infra.
71. CAL. CONST. art. 11, § 8(j).
72. MID. CONST. art. XI-E, § S.
73. N.Y. CONST. art. 9, § 16; R.I. CONST. amend. 28, § 2.
74. OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; CAL.CONST. art. 11, § 11.
75. See text accompanying notes 171-293 in)fra.
76. In a number of jurisdictions, 'the legislature has been expressly granted
the power to define the area of municipal initiative. See, e.g., MIcm. CONST.
art. VIII, § 21; Mm-;. CONST. art. IV, § 36 (1896). (The power of the legislature presumably continues under the new home rule section of the constitution,
but it is no longer express. Mrr;N. CONST. art. XI, § 3.)
Legislative definition of the scope of municipal initiative is discussed in
text accompanying notes 99-108 in)ra, but it is appropriate to note at this
point that such power on the part of the legislature has been of varying utility
in narrowing the range of policy alternatives open to the courts. In Minnesota, for example, charters "may provide for any scheme of municipal government not inconsistent with the constitution, and ... for the establishment and administration of all departments of a city government, and for the
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Some Common Misconceptions
The courts have, of course, had no alternative but to accept
the invitation. Without the benefit of guidance from history, constitutional tradition, or sharply delineated principle, courts have
been required to grapple with the questions of what "affairs" are
"municipal" and when "police, sanitary, or other similar regulations" are 'qocal' Acclaim has not been their reward. More than
a few commentators have criticized the courts for restricting the
scope of municipal initiative too narrowly.77 Even when commentators have not been critical, they have reported, as a fact, that
courts have narrowly defined the power of home rule municipalities. 8 It is, of course, generally conceded that the grant of home
rule has produced a greater range of powers than would otherwise
have existed,7 9 but much of the literature of home rule conveys
the impression that the judiciary has been responsible for confining municipal-power within narrow limitsP
regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as the legislature might
have done before home rule charters for cities and villages were authorized
by constitutional amendment in 1896." 3DW. STAT. § 410.07 (1981). There
is, in addition, express authorization for charter provisions dealing with the
duties of certain courts and the acquisition of property within or without the
municipal boundaries. Ibid. Although traditionally it has liberally construed
the initiative power of municipalities, the Unesota Supreme Court seem
never to have taken seriously the authorization to regulate "all local municipal functions, as fully as the legislature might have done before home rule
. . . " See Young v. Mall Iv. Co., 172 Mlnn. 428, 215 N.W. 840 (1927);
State v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915); Laird Norton Yards
v. City of Rochester, 117 Mlnn. 114,134 N.W. 644 (1912).
The Michigan legislature, by contrast, has provided in great detail for
subjects of mandatory and permissive inclusion in home rule charters. Mr.c.
STAT. ANx. §§ 52071-118. Judicial reaction to such detail is set forth in notes

106-07 inira.
77. See, e.g., Couxnem OF STATE GovEw
wrns, ST.r-&rLocAL ELAsTIONS 162-74 (1946); NEvADA LGisLATIv CousEL BunEAu, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 31-36; Richland, Constitutional City Home Rule in New York, 54
COLum. L. Itv. 311, 332, 85-36 (1954); Schmandt, aupranote 63, at S90-402,
405, 411.
78. See, e.g., 2 McQumw, op. cit. supra note 64, at 612; NATixAL MuiciPA. LEA=un, op. cit. supra note 34, at 97; Ruud, Legislative Jurisdictionof
Texas Home Rule Cities, 37 TExAs L. REv. 682, 686-88 (1959); 28 ORE. L.
RPv. 895 (1949).
79. See, e.g., 1 ANrrnu, Mui
,ucw
CoaroRATIo LAw § 3.10 (1902); Coinxcm OF STATE GovmuNrs, op. cit. supra note 77, at 164-66; Schmandt, supra
note 63, at 405-07.
80. The failure of many commentators to distinguish between the two
functions of home rule-as a grant of power to municipalities and as a possible limitation on the power of -thelegislature-at times renders it difficult
to ascertain whether reference is being made to limitations which the courts
have supposedly placed upon municipal initiative or to a failure to invalidate
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If reliance is placed upon what the courts have said, there is
some justification for this widespread impression. The cases are
legion in which language employed by the court suggests that invalidation of an attempted exercise of municipal initiative rests
upon the ground that the subject matter is not one of "local or
municipal concern" and hence beyond the scope of the powers
granted to municipalities." In some jurisdictions, the language
employed by the courts, at least on occasion, has conveyed the
impression that the effect of home rule has been to compartmentalize governmental power into an area of local concern, with respect to which only the municipalities are competent to legislate,
and an area of statewide concern, which is within the exclusive
province of the legislature. 82 In such jurisdictions every decision
sustaining state legislation appears to be a limitation of municipal initiative, with the implication that even if the legislation
were to be repealed, municipal regulation under the grant of home
rule powers would be impermissible."" Conversely, every decision
what the particular writer considers impermissible legislative intrusion on
municipal autonomy. One commentator, for example, after a review of Nebraska decisions disclosing that home rule in that state has not resulted in
any substantial restrictions on the power of the legislature, concludes that
°"the law of municipal home rule in Nebraska is embalmed in Dillon's Rule
instead of being enshrined in the state constitution." Winter, Municipal Home
Rule, A Progran Report?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 447, 471 (1957). Dillon's rule, however, concerns municipal initiative, not limitations on legislative power. See
note 26 supra.
The following references appear to be directed at least in part toward
supposed judicial limitations on municipal initiative, but for the reasons indi-

cated, certainty is not possible. ANnansoN & WnmNnu, AmumcA CrT Gov151-55 (rev. ed. 1954); MoTrr, HouM Rut Fon AMERICA'S CITIFM

ERNNENT

22-2s (Am. Mun. Ass'n Urban Action Series No. 101, 1949); U.S. ADvisonY
COarai'N ON INTERGOvERNuENTAL RELATIoNs, op. cit. supra note 35, at 36;
Walker, Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, 50 Nw. UL. REv.
571, 579-82 (1955).
81. See, e.g., People a rel. Miller v. Johnson, 84 Colo. 143, 80 Pac. 233
(1905); Kansas City v. J.I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 387 Mo. 913, 87
S.W.2d 195 (1935); Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 125
Neb. 825, 252 N.W. 407 (1934); County Sees., Inc. v. Seacord, 278 N.Y. 34,
15 N.E2d 179 (1938); Niehaus v. State ex rel. Bd. of Educ., 111 Ohio St. 47,
144 N.E. 433 (1924); City of Tulsa v. McIntosh, 141 Okla. 220, 284 Pac. 875
(1930); City of Woodburn v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 82 Ore. 114, 101 Pae. 301
(1916); City of Madison v. Tolzmann, 7 Wis. 2d 570, 97 N.W.2d 513 (1959);
Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 222 Wis. 58, 267 N.W. 25 (1930).
82. See, e.g., Davis v. City & County of Denver, 140 Colo. 30, 342 P.2d
674 (1959); City of Canon City v. Merris, 187 Colo. 169, 823 P.2d 614 (1958);
State ex rel. Garner v. Missouri & Kan. Tel. Co., 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41

(1905).
83. See discussion in Schmandt, upra note 63, at 387-98.
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sustaining the exercise of municipal initiative would, in such jurisdictions, appear to have the effect of precluding later state legislation superseding the local charter or ordinance. Adherence to
such a construction of the constitutional provisions would, as
Professor McGoldrick has stated, "ultimately all but destroy
municipal home rule."as The considerations which militate against
substantial judicially imposed limitations on the power of the
legislature are sufficiently weighty that if courts are required to
deny state control in order to permit the exercise of municipal
initiative, it seems inevitable that the latter will be held to extend
to progressively fewer subjects5s
The impression created by such judicial language -that municipal initiative is limited to matters of "local" or "municipal"
concern and that these are narrowly defined - is misleading.
Analysis of the decisions reveals that, with the possible exception
of a single states the grant of municipal initiative in home rule
provisions has been broadly construed by the courts. There are,
of course, in almost every jurisdiction a few decisions limiting the
scope of municipal initiative, but the record is clear that judicially
imposed limitations upon municipal initiative are few in number
and, in most jurisdictions, have not resulted in denying municipalities power to legislate concerning those matters which even
the staunchest advocates of local autonomy consider appropriate
87
for local-control
84. McGoLurcx, L&w A PRAcTicE or MumciAL Hoz.mE BuLE 19161930, at 817 (1933).
85. Wisconsin's experience with home rule tends to support this conclu-

sion. Municipalities in that state are granted initiative by both constitution
and statute. If the exercise of a particular power is attributable to the constitutional grant, -thelegislature's power to supersede the local determination

is severely limited. No similar limitation on the legislature exists if -the municipal power is based upon the statutory grant. The result has been that
the constitutional grant of power to municipalities has been construed very
restrictively, while the statutory grant has been construed quite liberally.
See HAsmwsiCX, op. cit. .mpranote 62.
Caution should be exercised, however, not to read too much into the Wbs-

consin experience. The existence of the broad statutory grant of municipal

initiative has meant, in practice, that Teference to the constitutional grant is
necessary only if there is state legislation inconsistent with the municipal
regulation. Consequently, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has not been required -todetermine the scope of the constitutional grant of initiative in the

absence of conflicting state legislation.

86. See text accompanying notes 162-66 infra.

87. See 1 Axrm u, op. cit. supra note 79, § 3.10. Contrary conclusions by
commentators are frequently unsupported by reference to judicial decisions.
See, e.g., authorities cited in note 80 supra.These unsupported conclusions are
then relied on as tending to prove similar conclusions by later commentators.
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Proof of this assertion depends, in part, on an analysis of the
grounds upon which courts may invalidate municipal legislation.
Home rule, as stated repeatedly in this Article, is a method of

distributing power between state and local governments. It is not
intended to increase the sum total of governmental power. ConSee, e.g., the obvious reliance by the NEVADA LExasLAwIVE CouNSmLBURAu,
op. cit. supranote 77, on the earlier report of CouxcrL oF STATE GOVE NmENTS,
op. cit. supra note 77.
When reference is made to judicial decisions, citations frequently fail to
support the conclusion. For example, one leading treatise states that "it is
generally held matters not pertaining to municipal government cannot be
regulated by provisions of home rule charters . . . ." 2 McQtumL, op. it.
supra note 64, at 612. Of the eleven cases cited, the holding of only one supports ,the proposition: City of Pontiac v. Ducharme, 278 Mich. 474, 270 N.W.
754 (1936) (city has power to acquire land outside its limits); Attorney General ex rel. Lennam v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 631, 196 N.W. 391 (1923)
(correctly cited; city lacks power to regulate wages and hours of employees
of those of its contractors performing work of state-wide concern); State ex
rel. Abel v. Gates, 190 Mo. 540, 89 S.W. 881 (1905) (jurisdiction of court -to
enjoin passage of ordinance); Morrow v. Kansas City, 186 Mo. 675, 85 S.W.
572 (1905) (city has power to adopt a new charter); Stanford v. Summers,
247 App. Div. 627, 288 N.Y.S. 921 (1936) (charter provision upheld); City of
Portland v. Welch, 154 Ore. 286, 59 P.2d 228 (1936) (invalidating state legislation providing for administrative supervision of municipal taxation); City
of Woodburn v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 82 Ore. 114, 161 Pac. 391 (1916)
(state public utilities commission may -regulate utility rates notwithstanding
prior franchise granted by city); Cameron v. City of Waco, 8 S.W.2d 249
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) (municipal power upheld); Green v. City of Amarillo,
244 S.W. 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) (properly cited; city cannot exempt itself
from tort liability resulting from proprietary function; on appeal, the deciion, though affirmed, was expressly rested on quite different grounds: conflict
with state statute, conflict with constitutional prohibition against damaging
private property for a public purpose without compensation, and constitutional guarantee of a remedy for every injury - Green v. City of Amarillo,
267 S.W. 702 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1924)); Keel v. Pulte, 10 S.W.2d 694 (Tex.
Comm'n of App. 1928) (construction of charter); State ex rel. Sleeman v.
Baxter, 195 Wis. 437, 219 N.W. 858 (1928) (legislature has power to enact
special legislation concerning local affairs absent municipal exercise of home
rule powers).
Similarly, the Chicago Home Rule Commission concluded that "it appears unlikely that a grant of constitutional home-rule power will materially
enhance Chicago's power to perform services for its citizens . .. . Substantial increments to the city's service powers would probably still be dependent
on delegations from the General Assembly . . . ." CHicAco HorE Ruiz
COMM'N, MODERNIZING A CiTY GOVERNMENT 262 (1954). But without ex-

ception the cases relied upon by the Commission to support this conclusion
involved only the question of whether the performance of service functions
by a home rule municipality was subject to control by the state legislature,
not the question of whether a municipality might render a service without
legislative authorization. See id. at 253-61.
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sequently, a decision that municipal legislation violates the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution or a provision of
the state bill of rights is not a limitation on municipal initiative.88
In such cases, the limitation is not imposed because the matter
is not one of "local" or "municipal" concern, but because it is
beyond the power of government generallyP9
Municipal legislation may also be invalidated on the ground
that it conflicts with state legislation or enters an area which the
legislature has pre-empted for exclusive control at the state level.
Consideration of whether limits ought to be placed upon the
power of the legislature to supersede municipal legislation in this
manner and the role of the courts in determining whether to construe state legislation as superseding local regulation is beyond
the scope of this Article. The only point to be made here is,
simply, that invalidation of local legislation on these grounds is
not a judicial limitation of the initiative. The denial of municipal
power, in such cases, does not result from a judicial determination
that the subject dealt with by the municipal legislation is not appropriate for control at the local level, but from the necessity of
choosing between giving effect to either municipal legislation or
state legislation. Invalidation of the municipal legislation rests,
therefore, not upon a determination that the municipality has no
interest or insufficient interest to regulate the matter, but upon
the ground that the legislature has determined that the state has
a greater interest or that it is a more appropriate forum than the
88. CmCAGO HOmE Ru . Comm'N, op. cit. supra note 87, at 272; Mor,
op. cit. mpra note 80, at 20. The state could not, of course, even if it would,
exempt municipalities from the prohibitions placed upon states by the federal constitution. Moreover, the prevailing understanding that home rule
municipalities are subject to general limitations on governmental power imposed by state constitutions is clearly reflected in the requirement, almost
always express, that powers exercised by municipalities are to be "consistent
with" or "subject to" the Constitution. The point has not, however, always
been clearly recognized. See, e.g., LEPAwsny, op. cit. supra note 38, at 50-51.
89. Occasionally, it is unclear whether invalidation of municipal legislation rests on -the ground that the municipality has exceeded the power of
government generally or- upon the ground that the legislation exceeds merely
the power of the municipality. See, e.g., Ford v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. 137,
79 S.W.9n8 (1904); Good Humor Corp. v. City of New York, 290 N.Y. 312,
49 N-E.2d 153 (1943); State ex rel. Thomas v. Semple, 112 Ohio St. 559, 148
N.E. 342 (1925), overzdet in State ex -rel.McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio
St. 320, 98 N.E.2d 8S5 (1951). The technique of avoiding major constitutional questions, that particular legislation is beyond the power of government generally, by deciding comparatively less important constitutional
questions, that the legislation is beyond the power of municipal government,
is discussed in text accompanying notes 182-88 & 209-82 infra.
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city council for resolving the problems dealt with by the regulationf °
More difficult questions are raised by decisions invalidating
municipal legislation on the ground that the subject with which it
deals has, under the state constitution, been committed to the
exclusive control of the state legislature. Since they do not rest
upon a denial of governmental power generally or upon the necessity of choosing between conflicting state and local legislation,
there is reason to read such decisions as establishing judicially
imposed limitations on the scope of municipal initiative. This is
particularly true when the constitutional provision construed by
the court as assigning the subject exclusively to the legislature
does not, on a fair reading, seem to compel that result.0 1 Nevertheless, closer analysis suggests that decisions of this type ought
to be distinguished from decisions in which the invalidation of
municipal legislation is based upon a determination that the subject dealt with is not one of "local" or "municipal" concern and
hence beyond the grant of municipal initiative. The decision of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth ex rel. Tru8cott
v. Philadelphia2"is instructive. In that case the court invalidated
an ordinance, enacted pursuant to authority granted by the city
charter, abolishing certain offices which prior to the City-County
Consolidation Amendment to the Pennsylvania constitution"8 had
been county offices. That amendment provides, in relevant part,
that upon its adoption "all county officers shall become officers of
the City of Philadelphia and, until the General Assembly shall
otherwise provide, shall continue to perform their duties. . ....
The decision was not, of course, based upon the ground that the
organization of city government was beyond the grant of municipal
90. Opinions in cases of this type frequently contain language apparently
restrictive of municipal initiative. Each of the cases cited in note 81 supra,
and a majority of those cited in note 82 supra, actually involve conflicts between state and local legislation, although the language employed by the
courts suggests that the decisions were dependent on a determination of the
scope of municipal initiative.
91. See, e.g., Royal v. Barry, 160 A.2d 572 (R.I. 1960), in which, by dictum, the court indicated that even in the absence of conflict with state legislation a charter provision requiring final decisions of the school committee
to be made in public session was invalid because "the constitution expressly
and affirmatively reserves to the Legislature sole responsibility in the field
of education ....

."

Id. at 575. But R.I. CONST. art. XII, on which the

court based its decision, provides only that "it shall be the duty of the general
assembly -to promote public schools," hardly a compelling basis for concluding -thatthe legislature's power is exclusive.
92. 880 Pa. 367, 111 A.2d 136 (1955).
93. PA. CONST. art. XIV, § 8.
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initiative, but upon the explicit language of the City-County Consolidation Amendment assigning to the legislature the function of
determining when to abolish the offices in question. Even in those
cases in which the constitutional language relied upon by the courts
as granting sole power over a subject to the legislature is less explicit, it is no less true that the invalidation of municipal legislation
is based upon construction of some provision other than the one
granting home rule powers9 4 For this reason, it seems more appropriate to consider cases of this type together with those in which the
question is whether state legislation should be construed as inconsistent with local legislation. In both types of cases, the question is
not the meaning of the home rule provision, but the meaning of
some other law, whether constitution or statute, which may have
the effect of making inroads upon the power conferred upon home
rule municipalitiesP5
Repeated statements in the literature that the scope of municipal initiative has been narrowly construed by the courts are
partially a consequence of failure to recognize that in the three
types of cases discussed immediately above, invalidation of local
legislation rests on some basis other than a judicial determination
that the subject matter of the legislation is inappropriate for control at the local level. Such statements are also attributable to a
too frequent failure to recognize that phrases such as 'local affairs," "municipal affairs," and "self-government" have been made
to serve a dual purpose. On the one hand, they mark the outer
limits of the grant of power to home rule municipalities, the point
beyond which a municipality may not legislate without delegation
from the legislature. On the other hand, the phrases also describe,
at least in those jurisdictions in which home rule is construed as
a limitation on the power of the legislature, the area in which
municipal legislation is superior to conflicting state legislation 0 A
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cherrington v. Hutsinpiller, 112 Ohio St. 468,
147 N.. 647 (1925); City of Sapulpa v. Land, 101 Okla. 22, 23 Pac. 640
(1924) (alternative holding); :Ruth v. Merrill, 43 0kla. 764, 144 Pac. 371
(1914); In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137 (1891).

95. The desirability of considering the cases in this context is somewhat
increased by ,the fact that most cases of this type appear to involve local
legislation affecting either the judiciary or the educational system. See cases

cited notes 91 & 94 supra. Since invariably there is a substantial amount
of state legislation concerning these subjects, 'the possibility of conflict or
preemption is almost always available as an alternative ground of decision.
See State ex rel. ilarbach v. City of Milwaukee, 189 Wis. 84, 206 N.W. 210
(1926).
96. See Fordtibm, supra note 50, at 329, 345. Still another function is
served by these phrases in Minnesota. The Minnesota home rule provision
has been construed as placing no limitations upon the power of the legisla-
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court might, with no inconsistency, find that a particular subject
is a matter of "local concern" for the former purpose, and yet not
a matter of "local" but of "statewide concern" for the latter purpose. Indeed, courts have done so with some frequency. 7
This is not to suggest that home rule grants are construed as
permitting municipalities to legislate on all subjects so long as
there is no conflicting state legislation or constitutional provision

assigning a particular subject to the exclusive control of the state
legislature. There are, in almost every jurisdiction, decisions holding a particular subject beyond the scope of municipal initiative."5
A brief discussion of divergent theories concerning the source of
municipal home rule power is necessary to an understanding of
these decisions.

Constitutional and Legislative Home Rule
In perhaps a majority of home rule jurisdictions, the grant of
municipal initiative flows directly from the state constitution. In
others, however, the source is statutory,"9 the constitutional provision concerning home rule serving only to require or authorize
ture to legislate with respect to municipal corporations, but where the subject is one of "local or municipal concern," a charter provision or ordinance
enacted pursuant thereto will be given effect notwithstanding the existence
of conflicting state legislation, unless the legislature explicitly or by fair implication has indicated an intention that the statute shall prevail. See State
ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crookston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W. 81 (1058).
The concept of "local or municipal concern" thus -serves as a rule of construction rather than a doctrine of constitutional law.
97. In Ohio, for example, the constitutional grant of authority to municipalities "to exercise all powers of local self-government" has been construcd
as authorizing the imposition of taxes, but since taxation is a subject of statewide concern, the legislature retains the authority to deny or limit municipal
authority. See Glander & Dewey, Municipal Taxation - A Study of the PreEmption, Doctrine, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 72 (1948).
Similarly, in Oklahoma the power of a city to "frame a charter for its
own government" has been construed to authorize enactment of Sunday closing ordinances, but the legislature retains authority to enact legislation superseding such ordinances. Sparger v. Harris, 191 Okla. 583, 131 P.2d 1011 (1942);
see Merrill, ConstitutionalHome Rule for Cities - Oklahoma Version, 5 OKLA.
L. REV. 139, 196-98 (1952).
Similar decisions might be cited for virtually all home rule states. See 1
ANTIEAU, op. cit. supra note 79, § 3.06; Note, 72 HARV. L. Rav. 737, 740-1
(1959).
98. And there would undoubtedly be more if municipalities had not, by
and large, exercised restraint and made an effort to legislate concerning various
matters which by general understanding are within the exclusive control of
the legislature. See text accompanying note 66 supra.
99. In a number of jurisdictions, e.g., Wisconsin, a grant of municipal
initiative is contained in both constitution and statute.
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such an enactment by the legislature. 10 0 The argument is occasionally made that in jurisdictions of the latter type, municipalities do not truly possess home rule because of the retention of
ultimate power by the legislature to define narrowly the scope of
municipal initiative 0 1 Although the legislature's power to withhold charter-making authority lends credence to this argument,
experience demonstrates that the statutory grant may materially
increase the extent of local autonomy in fact. 0 2 The statutes divide into two primary types, those in which the delegation of
charter-making power is cast in broad terms similar to the terms
employed in constitutional provisions 0 3 and those in which the
matters that must or may be dealt with in a charter are specified
in some detail.' 04 In jurisdictions with the latter type of statute,
municipal initiative is, of course, more restricted than it is in jurisdictions in which home rule is directly conferred by the constitution or those in which the statutory grant is broadly written.
Consequently, the traditional classification of home rule states
into "constitutional" and "statutory" seems inappropriate, at
least for the purpose of determining the scope of municipal initiative. A more useful classification would divide the jurisdictions
100. A number of courts have held 'that in the absence of such authorization, statutes conferring charter-maling authority upon municipalities are
invalid delegations of legislative power. See, e.g., Phillips v. City of Atlanta,
210 Ga. 72, 77 S.E2d 723 (1953); Elliott v. City of Detroit, 121 Mich. 011,
84 N.W. 820 (1899); State ez rel. Mueller v. Thompson, 149 Wis. 488, 137
N.W. 20 (1912). The problem is carefully considered in MeBain, The Delegation of Legislative Power to Cities, 32 Por,. ScI. Q. 276, 391 (1917).
101. See, e.g., CouxcrL OF STATE GovEsmw,,-Ts, op. cit. supra note
77, at 162; MOTT, op. cit. supra note 80, at 14.

102. Strangely, the proponents of the argument recognize that Wisconsin
municipalities possess substantial autonomy, greater than in perhaps any other
state. See Comcu, OF STATE GovEiuan
s, op. cit. supra note 77, at
166. But the broad initiative power of Wisconsin municipalities is derived
from -thestatutory and not the constitutional grant. See HAGF;sicn, op. cit.
supra note 62. The Minnesota experience is similar. See Anderson, Municipal
Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 Mmx. L. REv. 306 (19n2); Note, Home Rule and
Special Legislation in Minnesota, 47 Mum. L. REV. 621, 631-34 (1963).
Moreover, such arguments tend to ignore -the failure of the courts in
constitutional home rule jurisdictions to construe home rule provisions as
restricting to any substantial degree the power of the legislature to enact laws
concerning local government To the extent that the legislature retains unlimited or virtually unlimited power to supersede an exercise of municipal
initiative conferred by the constitution, there is only a semantic difference
between constitutional and legislative home rule, at least when the latter is
defined in broad terms.
103. E.g., Mm.'x. STAT. § 410.07 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 66.11(5) (1961).
104. E.g., Mic. STAT. A-wN. §§ 5.2071-2118 (1949); W. VA. CODE ch. 8A
(1961).
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according to the terms of the grant, whatever its source. Since
the primary - perhaps the only -

purpose of home rule is to

provide a flexible system of change emanating from the community where the problems originate, to the extent that municipalities are bound to detailed authorizing legislation, thus weak-

ening municipal initiative, the very concept of home rule is
threatened.'"°
The differences in the terms by which power is granted, in the
two types of jurisdictions, are to some extent reflected in judicial

decisions. A legislative policy of defining with a degree of specificity the powers exercisable by home rule municipalities, whatever its merits, has quite properly led the courts in such jurisdictions to hold that important or novel powers not specified in the

statutory grant are beyond the scope of municipal initiative.1 00

The extent to which municipal initiative, in such jurisdictions, is
restricted by the absence of specific grants of power should not,
however, be overstated. Municipal power has frequently been

sustained in situations where the courts might, without undue
restrictiveness, have required a more specific authorization from

the state legislature.'0 7 In short, the detailed definition of home
rule powers narrows somewhat the opportunities for judicial
105. See CouNcm or STATE GovERNmENTs, op. cit. supra note 77, at 172.
106. See, e.g., Attorney General v. City of Detroit, 225 Mich. 631, 196
N.W. 391 (1923) (charter provision establishing minimum wages and maximum hours for employee of city's contractors held invalid as applied to
projects of -state concern); Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W.
722 (1920) (general grant of police power held not to confer power to adopt
zoning ordinance); City of Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480
(1919) (authorization to control use of streets held insufficient to confer power
to regulate rates of public utility); State en Tel. Navin v. Weir, 26 Wash. 501,
67 Pac. 226 (1901) (city lacks power to authorize council to try election contests); State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 45 Pac. 23 (1896)
(city lacks authority to confer upon state court of general jurisdiction power
to try election contests); City of Tacoma v. State, 4 Wash. 64, 20 Pac. 847
(1892) (dictum that city lacks power of eminent domain).
107. E.g., the Michigan decisions cited in note 100 supra should be contrasted with Dooley v. City of Detroit, 370 Mich. 194, 121 N.W.2d 724 (1003)
(authorization to levy and collect excises held sufficient to confer power to
levy income tax on both residents and nonresidents); Bowler v. Nagel, 228
Mich. 434, 200 N.W. 258 (1924) (authorization to provide for the compensation of officers confers power to establish employee pension system). Similarly,
the Washington decisions cited in note 106 supra should be contrasted with
Hilzinger v. Gillman, 56 Wash. 228, 105 Pac. 471 (1909) (charter provision
providing for recall of councilmen held valid notwithstanding absence of
statutory authority); Howe v. Barto, 12 Wash. 627, 41 Pac. 908 (1895) (authority to provide for assessment and collection of taxes confers power to
provide that tax deed is prima facie evidence of compliance with procedural
requirements).
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policymaking concerning the scope of municipal initiative, but
it does not obliterate them.
If the tendency of judicial decisions, whatever the source of
honfie rule powers, were to narrowly restrict the municipal initiafive, legislative definition might serve the function of making
clear that certain subjects were of "local" or "municipal" concern.
The tendency of judicial decisions, however, has been otherwise.
Although the number and importance of judicially imposed limitations on municipal initiative has been somewhat greater in
those jurisdictions where the source of municipal power is statutory, particularly where the legislature has prescribed the areas
of local concern in some detail, there are relatively few reported
decisions in either "statutory" or "constitutional" jurisdictions
in which an exercise of home rule power has been invalidated on
the ground that the municipality has attempted to go beyond
matters of local concern. Perhaps the most surprising conclusions
to emerge from a review of these decisions is that after nearly
a century of experience with home rule, no definition of the extent
of municipal initiative has evolved.' 0 8 Decisions in which municipal initiative is limited are scattered, seemingly lacking any solid
foundation in principle. Only a few of the limitations imposed
have gained the support of a majority of the courts which have
had occasion to consider them.
Abrogation of Common Law
There axe, for example, several decisions invalidating an exercise of municipal power on the ground that municipal initiative
does not extend to abrogation of "applicable rules of common
law or equity." 09 These decisions rest upon the theory that the
"laws" with which municipal charters are, by the constitution,
required to be consistent include decisional law.n It is difficult
to imagine a doctrine potentially more threatening to local initia108. Couxcnm or STATE GovENm:ENs, op. cit. supra note 77, at 164.
109. City of Staples v. Minnesota Power &Light Co., 196 Minn. 303, 307,
265 N.W. 58, 60 (1936); see Laird Norton Yards v. City of Rochester, 117 MNim.
114, 134 N.W. 644 (1912); Genusa v. City of Houston, 10 S.W.2d 772 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
110. The Minnesota decisions appear to rest on a construction of the word
'laws" in the state constitution. Mnu. CoNsT. art. IX, § 36 (1896). So straightforward an approach was not possible in Texas since the constitution requires
only consistency with "general laws enacted by the legislature ...

."

TEx.

CoxsT. art. XI, § 5. But the court of civil appeals reasoned that the state's
common-law reception statute had the effect of making the common law a
"general law enacted by the legislature." The argument is convincingly refuted in Ruud, supranote 78, at 691-93.
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tive. Although the power to determine governmental organization
or the services to be performed by municipalities apparently
would not be limited by such a doctrine, it presumably would
result in a very substantial, perhaps a total, denial of municipal
police power in the absence of legislative authorization. A municipal zoning ordinance enacted under home rule powers would,
for example, appear to collide with the common-law right of a
landowner to determine for himself the use to be made of his
land, subject only to the law of nuisance. Other uses made of the
power conferred by home rule grants would also seem to be prohibited under the doctrine."'
The doctrine is plainly at variance with the fundamental purpose of home rule, permitting municipalities to exercise new powers, and hence to alter the common law, without prior authorization by statute. It is, moreover, patently inconsistent with decisions in other jurisdictions" 2 and, indeed, with decisions in the
very jurisdictions in which it was announced."' These latter decisions recognize that insofar as a subject is one of "local concern"
the municipal council has been granted initiative power coextensive with that of the legislature. n Examination of the decisions
announcing the doctrine suggests that they represent merely another instance of the ancient adage about hard cases, for it reveals that in each case the court employed an unfortunate theory
to deal with an inherently difficult problem. Two of the cases
raised questions concerning the power of a city to regulate its
own contractual liability; the third involved one of the few instances in which a municipality has attempted to exercise home
rule powers for the purpose of enacting purely civil law.
Regulation of Claims Against Municipalities
The tendency of some municipalities to employ their lawmaking power in a manner oppressive to claimants has placed
considerable stress on the exercise of municipal initiative to regulate tort, contract, or other claims against the municipality.
Courts have invalidated municipal legislation in this area on
111. See, e.g., Howe v. Barto, 12 Wash. 627, 41 Pac. 908 (1895); cases
cited in notes 112 & 113 infra.
112. E.g., State ex rel. Vogt v. Reynolds, 295 Mo. 375, 244 S.W. 929
(1922); State ex rel. McBride v. Deckebach, 117 Ohio St. 227, 157 N.E. 758

(1927).
113. E.g., Schigley v. City of Waseca, 106 Minn. 94, 118 N.W. 259 (1908);
Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Bankston, 51 S.W.2d 304 (Tex. Comm'n App.

1932).

114. See Anderson, supra note 102, at 315-16. But see McBAI,, TnE
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(1918).
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such tenuous grounds as that it violates the common law, or that
it contravenes a prohibition upon damaging private property
without payment of compensation" 5 or prohibitions upon special
legislation,"" or simply on the ground that it is "unreasonable.""' 7 Nevertheless, the propriety of such legislation has, in
the absence of conflicting state regulation,"" frequently been upheld by the courts and is supported by the clear weight of judicial authority" 9 There is, undoubtedly, a strong argument to be
115. City of Amarillo v. Tutor, 267 S.W. 697 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924).
116. City of Tulsa v. McIntosh, 141 Okla. 220, 284 Fec. 875 (1930). There
is language in the opinion which suggests that the municipal legislation involved was not a matter of local concern, and hence beyond the initiative,
because it might affect any resident of the state. As Professor Merrill has
pointed out, however, if this were the test 'there would be nothing left of
the home rule privilege."
2 errill, aupra note 97, at 170.
The actual ground of decision, that the municipal legislation violates constitutional provisions prohibiting the legislature from enacting special legislation, is no more satisfactory. The court reasoned that municipal power could
not be greater than the power of the legislature. While this is undoubtedly
true as respects those constitutional provisions that are meant to limit governmental power generally, such as guarantees of due process or free speech,
it plainly is inappropriate -to prohibitions of special legislation. Viewed in
historical context, such provisions dearly were intended only to limit the
power of -the legislature. Moreover, to construe -the provisions as applicable
to municipalities would render the home rule provision of the constitution
meaningless. See Merrill, supranote 97, at 157-59.

117. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Wells, 79 Okla. 39, 191 Pac. 186 (1920);
Born v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash. 719, 68 Pae. 386 (1902). Professor MelBaln
has suggested that these cases might be understood as resting on the power
of -acourt to declare municipal ordinances invalid because they are "unreasonable." McBAn, op. cit. vupra note 114, at 448. That judicial power does
not, however, exist independently but only as a rule of construction to aid
in determining whether a particular exercise of municipal power has been
authorized by the legislature. See STAsox & KApua-, MumicwAL CorwoaATmoxS 12, nA (3d ed. 1959).

A somewhat more likely basis for the decisions is that the municipal legislation was deemed by the court to be violative of due process. This view is
supported by language in one such decision, quoted in the others, that "charter provisions of the character in question, whether enacted by the legislature,
or, as inthe present case, by the city itself, are to be upheld only so far as
they are reasonable and tend to the due administration of justice." Durham
v. City of Spokane, 27 Wash. 615, 622, 68 Pac. 383, 386 (1902); see Merrill,
supra note 97, at 157.
118. See, e.g., Hayward v. City of Schenectady, 251 App. Div. 007, 297
N.Y. Supp. 736 (1937).

119. See, e.g., Salo v. City of Pasadena, 162 Cal. 714, 124 Pac.539 (1912)
(dictum); Schigley v. City of Waseca, 106 Mlnn. 94, 118 N.W. 259 (1908);
Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108, 115 S.W. 446 (1908); State ez rel. Gavigan v. Dierkes, 214 Mo. 578, 113 S.W. 1077 (1908); Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y.
61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933); City of Waco v. Landingham, 138 Tex. 156, 157
S.W.2d 631 (1941); Scurry v. City of Seattle, 8 Wash. 278, 36 Pac.145 (1894).
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made for state regulation of municipal liability, not only in the
interest of uniformity but as a means of achieving a proper balance between the interests of local governments and the interests
of those who deal with them. In the absence of such regulation,
however, governmental liability, because of its impact upon the
municipal treasury, unquestionably is of sufficient interest to
municipalities to come within the grant of power to deal with
all matters of "local self-government." Even those courts which
have invalidated a particular municipal regulation of liability
have not, with but one exception, 20 rested their decisions on a
contrary conclusion. Nevertheless, the unfairness of regulations
adopted by some municipalities does suggest that although the
subject of claim regulation is of municipal concern, courts should
perhaps have power to determine that a particular regulation is
outside the scope of municipal initiative, at least in the absence
of specific authorization by the legislature. The justification for
this approach rests upon the differences between the municipal
council and the state legislature, a matter discussed at length in
121
a subsequent section of the Article.
Enactment of PrivateLaw
The grant of home rule power has not generally been understood as authorizing municipalities to enact purely private law,
i.e. law governing civil relationships.2 Municipalities have not
sought an express grant of such power and if they had, it is virtually certain that it would not have been granted. Public and
private law are not, however, separated by a clear line of division. It is, for example, common practice for a court to refer to
a municipal safety regulation, enacted under the police power,
as a standard for determining whether an individual is guilty of
negligence.2 3 Suppose, however, that the city attempts to regulate the conduct without enacting penal regulations but merely
by declaring what standard of care should be observed. Decisions
in Ohio 124 and Missouri. 5 apparently sustain municipal power
120. See note 116 supra. In Green v. City of Amarillo, 244 S.W. 241 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922), an ordinance exempting the municipality from liability arising from operation of a municipally owned streetcar system was invalidated
on the ground that the matter was not one of local concern because the public at large was affected. See discussion note 116 supra. However, the affirmance of this decision by the Texas Supreme Court was expressly rested
on other grounds. See note 87 upra.
121. See text at notes 257-90 infra.
122. McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 114, at 673-74.
123. PRossER, TORTS § 34, at 152-64 (2d ed. 1955); see note 130 infra.
124. Leis v. Cleveland Ry., 101 Ohio St. 162, 128 N.E. 73 (1930).
125. State ex rel. Vogt v. Reynolds, 296 Mo. 875, 244 S.W. 929 (1922).
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in such cases, though without facing up to the question of the
power of a home rule municipality to enact private law. In a few
cases, the municipality has gone further and attempted to create
a new liability. Genusa v. City of Houston,12' in which the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals pronounced the curious doctrine that a
home rule city could not alter an established common-law doctrine, was such a case. The ordinance in question required the
owners of automobile rental agencies to post a bond or insurance
policy in favor of any person who might be injured through the
fault of the operator of a rented vehicle. Liability was created
where none had existed previously, for under Texas decisions the
owner of an automobile was liable only for his own negligence
or that of an agent. Invalidation of the ordinance on the ground
that the municipality lacked power to create a new civil liability
would have been more persuasive than the ground actually stated
by the court. Although the municipality obviously had an interest inprotecting its citizens, reliance upon this interest to sustain
municipal power would prove too much, for it would justify any
purely civil law enacted by a municipality, contrary to the general understanding that the grant of charter-making authority
does not authorize wholesale enactment of private law by municipalities. Courts in other jurisdictions have indicated that imposition of civil liability
is beyond the scope of municipal initiative
27
under home rule
The problem of private law making by home rule municipalities was explicitly considered for the first time in a legislative
context in the Model Constitutional Provisions for Home Ride
drafted by Dean Fordham for the American Municipal Association. Section 6 thereof provides that the grant of initiative "does
not include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil
relationships except as an incident to an exercise of an independent municipal power... -,-'2
Virtually identical language has
been adopted in the sixth edition of the National Municipal
League's Model State ConstitutionY"9 The meaning of these pro:126. 10 S.Wad 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
127. Young v. Mall Inv. Co., l72 Mlnn. 428, 215 N.W. 840 (1927); King
v. J.E. Crosbie, Inc., 191 Okla. 525, 131 P.2d 105 (1942). In State ez reC.
McBride v. Deckebach, 117 Ohio St. 227, 157 N.E. 758 (1927), -the court
sustained an ordinance requiring every applicant for a taxi license to deposit
a liability insurance policy with the city. The ordinance did not, however,
attempt to create a new liability but only to provide a means of collection
for any judgment that might be rendered under applicable law.

128. AwMEICAN

MuNcIPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONsTrrTxONAL PRoVIsIONs

FoR MUMIcIPAL HoME RUm 19 (1953).
129. NATIONAL MUmxciPxL LEAGUE, MODEL

(6th ed. 1963).

STATE CONSTITUTION, §

8.02
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visions is not altogether clear. Conceivably, they are intended
only as a validation of the inevitable impact of public regulation
on private rights, as, for example, a zoning ordinance affects the
use which a landowner may make of his property. Such a construction would deny municipalities the power to define legal
relationships between private individuals, although municipal
legislation might continue to have indirect consequences for such
relationships.130
At the other extreme, the provisions might be construed as
permitting municipalities to regulate any purely private legal
relationships which in some manner are related to an area of
traditional municipal concern. Under this construction a municipality would not, for example, be permitted to declare void all
contracts not under seal, but its traditional power to regulate
the use of its streets would, presumably, permit enactment of an
ordinance establishing comparative, rather than contributory,
negligence as a defense to all automobile accidents occurring on
its streets. In view of the wide scope of municipal initiative traditionally granted to home rule municipalities and contemplated
by both model constitutional provisions,' 8 ' such a construction
would throw open the flood-gates. It would be a singularly unimaginative municipal attorney who was unable to find a connection between some traditional municipal power and almost any
private law which the council desired to enact. Dean Fordham's
brief commentary to section 6 indicates that so broad a power
of private law making was not intended. 82 Moreover, the text of
section 6 indicates that private law making by a municipality is
dependent upon not only the existence of an independent municipal power but "an exercise of an independent municipal
power."'183

In view of this requirement and since "independent municipal
power" presumably means a power other than that of enacting
private law, the most likely construction of the model provisions
130. Municipal legislation may indirectly affect private rights if it is
adopted to give content to a generalized standard under state law (e.g., where
a court holds that violation of a municipal traffic regulation constitutes negligence). In such cases, the ordinance does not of its own force render the
conduct negligent; and state law, not the ordinance, establishes the civil con24-25 (1932).
sequence of a violation. See FuuND, LEGISLATvE RmuLATioN
131. See text accompanying notes 171-73 infra.
132. AmmicAi" Mum~cnA Ass'x, op. cit. supra note 128, at 19-22. See

also Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44 NAT'L MuNIc. REv. 137, 142
(1955).

133. AmEmcmsis added.)

MuxicIPn,

ASS'N, op. cit. supra note 128, at 19. (Empia-
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is that private law may be enacted only if it is in aid of some
municipal policy or program which is expressed, at least in part,
by means other than the regulation of purely civil relationships.
If this construction is correct, a municipality might, as an incident of Sunday closing legislation, declare retail sales contracts
entered into on Sunday unenforceable; it could not, however,
legislate only with respect to the contracts. Similarly, although
the municipality presumably could not as part of a safe driving
program merely do away with contributory negligence as a defense
and establish comparative negligence in its stead, since that would
not be in aid of a municipal policy expressed independently of the
regulation of private rights, it might provide that any person
injured in consequence of the violation of a municipal speed limit
is entitled to recovery of treble damages.
The primary virtue of the model provisions, construed in this
manner, is that they enable municipalities to invoke the aid of
private parties in the implementation of local policy.33 This benefit is obtained, however, only at a considerable cost, since the wide
range of activities in which the modern municipality engages
means that the area in which enactment of private law is permitted is a large one and the opportunity for unsettling legal relationships created by general law is correspondingly great. Although the enactment of private remedies for violation of police
regulations is perhaps the most likely area for enactment of private law by municipalities, other possibilities also exist. In Raisch
v. Myers 35 the question arose whether the holder of an assessment bond secured by a lien was entitled to share in the surplus
proceeds of a foreclosure sale ordered on the suit of a prior lienor.
The bondholder's right of action for foreclosure was barred by
the statute of limitations, but the ordinance authorizing issuance
of the bonds provided that the lien should "continue until such
assessment is fully paid"' In reliance upon this language, the
bondholder argued that his lien remained in existence and might
be enforced by any remedy other than foreclosure. The property
owner urged that the lien had been destroyed under the general
law principle that a lien is extinguished by the lapse of time within which an action can be brought upon the principal obligation. 36 Under the Model ConstitutionalProvisionsfor Home Rule,
134. See Dunham, Private Enforcement of City Planning, 20 LAw &
CoNTrAw. PRoB. 463 (1955).

185. 27 Cal. 2d 773, 167 Pad 198 (1946).
136. The principle had been enacted into statute, but to avoid the added
complexity of a conflict between ordinance and statute, it is treated in the

ensuing discussion as having been established only by judicial decisions.
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the bondholder's position apparently would be sustained.""7 The
regulation of private rights is clearly "an incident to an exercise
of an independent municipal power," that of assessing landowners for the cost of improving streets.
Analysis of the Raisch case suggests that the model provisions'
solution to the problems posed by municipal enactment of private
law is not satisfactory. To focus solely upon the question of
whether the private law regulation is incidental to an exercise of
an independent municipal power, excludes from consideration the
more important factors of the importance of private law regulation to the municipality's total program and the extent to which
the regulation trenches upon state law. In Raisch the interest of
the municipality cannot be considered more than nominal.' The
disruptive effect of the ordinance upon state law is more difficult
to appraise. To some extent, the ordinance collides with the policy
underlying the limitation of actions. And although not directly
involved in Raisch, there is at least a potential conflict with
policies favoring the free marketability of land. However, even
if the private law enacted by the municipality does not appear
to have a seriously disruptive effect on legal relationships created
by general law, it should not be given effect unless it is demonstrably of some importance to the implementation of a municipal
policy or program. The prevailing assumption has been that home
rule powers do not extend to the enactment of private law. 8 9
Deviations from that understanding should be permitted only in
the event of clear necessity. The complexities created by 51 different law-making jurisdictions in what has become a single economic and social community are manageable; if each of the
thousands of cities and villages entitled to exercise home rule
powers were thereby empowered to adjust contract, property,
137. The Supreme Court of California held for the bondholder on the
ground that "the improvement of streets and the collection of costs therefor
are municipal affairs." Id. at 778, 167 P.2d at 201. Its opinion indicated no
recognition that the municipality had enacted private law, but two judges dissented on precisely that ground. Since the ordinance was in confllct with a
state statute, they had no occasion to consider whether it would have been
valid if there had been no conflicting statute.
138. Assuming that the municipality does have an interest in providing
an efficient collection mechanism for contractors engaged in street improvements, it is nevertheless difficult to understand the municipality's interest in
the precise question involved in Raisch: Whether, when foreclosure of the
lien was barred by limitations, the contractor should be able to recover a
portion of the proceeds from a foreclosure sale under another lien. Surely it
could not be argued that the contract price to the municipality was determined in part by this remote possibility of collection.
139. McBArI, op. cit. supra note 114, at 678-74.
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and the host of other legal relationships between private individuals, chaos would ensue' 40
If this analysis is correct, it seems to follow that the primary
error made by the draftsmen of the model constitutional provisions was the decision to attempt to deal with the problem by a
constitutional formula. Experience with private law enactments
by municipalities has been too limited. Litigation has been too
infrequent to permit generalization from the issues suggested by
the cases; and neither courts nor commentators, as Dean Fordham has stated, have "given adequate thought" to the problems 4 ' It is true that under the model provisions the legislature
retains power to curb any abuse by municipalities, but unless the
legislature exercises its power to deny municipalities all authority
to enact private law, thus avoiding the problem entirely, the retention of power by the legislature is an inadequate solution to
the problem.'4 The legislature has neither kmowledge nor time
adequate to permit it to assume primary responsibility for the
myriad issues presented by private law maling at the local level.
Although the legislature should, of course, have power to override decisions made by the courts, "we make an ill use of the
legislature," as Professor Hart has stated, "when we ask it to
even try to assume primary responsibility for all the questions
of interstitial and subordinate policy making which come before
the courts"'4 If for no other reason than the limited experience
with issues raised by municipal enactment of private law, "there
is no substitute for the intensive analysis and creative exposition
of principles and policies at the point at which general propositions come into contact with concrete situations, so that they
can be tested there."'" This must be accomplished, if at all, in
a judicial forum.
Regulation of Other Governmental Units
The extreme functional division of governmental power characteristic of most American states inevitably results in conflict
between the various agencies or political subdivisions. Predictably,
therefore, a substantial number of cases raise questions concern140. See Note, The Power of Ohio Municipalities to Enact Private Law,
9 OHio ST. LJ. 152 (1948).
141. Awxnmc~w Mlum PA Ass'x,

op. cit. supra note 128, at 21.
142. Although the restraint exercised by municipalities in -the past might
be taken as an indication that there is little reason to fear extensive private
law making in the future, the invitation has never before been as clear.
143. Hart, Comment on Courts and Lawmaldng, in LALm LnsTiTuTioNs
TODAY AND TomORRow 45 (Paulsen ed. 1959).
144. Id. at 42.
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ing the power of home rule municipalities to legislate with respect
to other agencies of state government. Since these other agencies
invariably owe their existence to constitutional provisions or
statutes and are extensively regulated thereby, virtually all of
the decisions rest upon some ground other than a determination
of whether the initiative granted home rule municipalities extends
to legislation concerning these other agencies. 145 In a few cases,
however, attempted municipal regulation of state agencies or
other political subdivisions has been invalidated in the absence
of conflicting statutes and without reliance upon a constitutional
provision construed as assigning the problem exclusively to the
legislature.
In La Grande 'v. Municipal Court40 the Oregon Supreme Court
stated broadly that the initiative exercisable by home rule municipalities did not extend to "extramural legislation," defined, in
part, as legislation operating upon governmental agencies other
than the municipality.1 47 Exercise of such power, the court held,
continued to be dependent upon legislative authorization even
after home rule. The necessity of protecting other governmental
agencies from interference by home rule municipalities lends persuasiveness to the court's sweeping generalization. Ultimate responsibility for the distribution of power among the various
agencies and subdivisions of state government is necessarily
vested in the legislature as the most broadly representative lawmaking body in the state. But these principles provide only a
starting point for analysis, not a mechanical answer for the manifold problems created by the conflicts between home rule municipalities and other agencies of state government.
The precise issue in La Grande was the validity of a charter
provision which established a municipal court with jurisdiction
over offenses against the city and granted defendants a right of
appeal to the state circuit court in the manner provided by state
of
law for appeals from justice of the peace courts. Invalidation 148
the attempted conferral of jurisdiction upon the circuit court
145. See, e.g., Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1950);
Matter of Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105 (1939); State ex rel. Mowrer
v. Underwood, 137 Ohio St. 1, 27 N.E.2d 773 (1940).
146. 120 Ore. 109, 251 Pac. 308 (1926).
147. The court also suggested, contrary to its prior holding in City of
Mckvfinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451, 109 Pac. 81 (1910), that the initiative did not extend to extraterritorial legislation. See text accompanying

notes 191-220 infra.
148. Accord, State ex rel. Fawcett v. Superior Court, 14 Wash. 604, 45
Pac. 23 (1896). Contra, Goldman v. Crowtaer, 147 Md. 282, 128 At]. 50
(1925); Union Depot RhR. v. The Southern Ry., 105 Mo. 562, 16 S.W. 020
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was grounded primarily upon the court's concern that "the municipality . . . [might] appropriate to its own use and behest
the whole judicial system of the state. 149 If the city were permitted to confer appellate jurisdiction, the court reasoned, it
might also confer original jurisdiction of every offense against
its ordinances, possibly swamping the court with minor matters
to such an extent as to interfere with its regular business. 10 This
argument might have been more persuasive if there had been
evidence of legislative concern to limit state courts to matters of
general law. The charter provision was, however, apparently
quite consistent with legislative policy, for the state courts had
been given appellate jurisdiction of presumably similar cases
originating in justice of the peace courts. Although not directly
applicable to the city's municipal court, the state legislation evidenced a policy, common to every state, of maling the judicial
machinery of the state available to the citizen as an appellate
tribunal for correction of errors in the frequently less formal and
often less qualified local courts. Under such circumstances, the
imagined risks which led the court to deny the municipality's
power seem insufficient. Retention of power by the legislature to
limit or deny the municipality's authority to confer jurisdiction
on the courts was an adequate safeguard.
In other contexts limitation of the initiative to preclude imposition of duties upon another agency of state government is appropriate. Thus, in Kiernan v. Portlandi the Oregon Supreme
Court held a charter amendment authorizing the city to build a
bridge invalid insofar as it attempted to impose the duty of maintenance upon a county without the latter's consent. Although the
potential threat to the county was essentially similar to that
posed by the effort to confer jurisdiction upon the courts, the
municipality's assertion of authority in Kiernan was not supported by the tradition or consistency with legislative policy
which existed in La Grande. Under these circumstances, it seems
appropriate to require that the municipality obtain authorization
(1891); State ex rel. Barber Asphalt Paving Co. v. District Court, g0 Minn.
457, 97 N.W.132 (1903). In several jurisdictions courts have reached a con-

clusion in accord with the decision in La Grande, but in reliance on a constitutional provision construed as granting the legislature exclusive power
to regulate the jurisdiction of courts. See, e.g., State ex rel. Cherrington v.
Hutsinpiller, 11- Ohio St. 468, 147 NME. 647 (1925); City of Sapulpa v. Land,
101 Okla. 22,223 Pae. 640 (1924).
149. 120 Ore. 109, 115, 251 Pac.308, 810 (1926).
150. Ibid. See also McBArx, op. cit. supra note 114, at 195.
151. 57 Ore. 454, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac. 402 (1910), appeal dismissed, 223
U.S. 151 (1912).
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from the legislature which, unlike the city council, is responsible
for the welfare of both the city and the county.'5 2
In recent years there has been an increasing amount of litigation concerning the power of municipalities to apply general regulatory measures to other governmental bodies, usually school
districts or counties. Since the issues posed by such litigation are
not uniquely related to home rule, extended consideration is beyond the scope of this Article but some discussion is warranted
insofar as the cases bear upon the limits of municipal initiative
under home rule. A recent California decision, County of Los
Angeles v. City of Los Angeles,'58 suggests the dimensions of the
problem. Pursuant to its home rule powers the city had adopted
ordinances, expressly applicable to the county, regulating the use
and subdivision of land and the construction and operation of
buildings within its boundaries. The county's request for a declaratory judgment that it was not bound to comply with these
ordinances was granted on a ground reminiscent of La Grande:
The initiative does not extend to municipal legislation directed
at other governmental agencies. The only justification offered for
so completely subordinating the city's interests to those of the
county was that the latter, as an agency of the state, was engaged
in the performance of state functions and hence was immune from
interference by the city because it was inferior to the state. Although supported by the weight of authority,5 the court's simplistic analysis is inadequate. The city, no less than the county,
is a state agency charged with responsibility for performance of
certain public functions. Accordingly, the court might as easily
have concluded that to the extent the county's activities inter152. See also West Linn v. Tufts, 75 Ore. 304, 146 Pac. 086 (1915), in
which the court invalidated a charter provision that required -the county
treasurer to pay over to the municipality road taxes collected from property
within its boundaries.
153. 28 Cal. Rep. 32 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
154. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. City of Tempe, 88 Ariz. 299, 356 P.2d
399 (1960); Green County v. City of Monroe, 3 Wis. 2d 196, 87 N.W.2d 827
(1958). Contra, Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. City of Cedar

Rapids, 252 Iowa 205, 106 N.W.2d 655 (1960); Kansas City v. School Dist.,
356 Mo. 364, 201 S.W.2d 930 (1947). An early California decision, Pasadena

School Dist. v. City of Pasadena, 166 Cal. 7, 134 Pac. 985 (1918), held that
a school district was subject to municipal building regulations, but it was
expressly overruled in Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574
(1956). (Since the existence of home rule power is irrelevant to the issues
posed by attempted municipal regulation of other governmental agencies,

no distinction is drawn here between cases in home rule and non-home rule

jurisdictions).
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fered with performance of the city's functions, the county had
exceeded its power.
Interference by the city and county with the performance of
their respective responsibilities is precisely what makes the issue
in the Los Angeles case so difficult to resolve.1 5 Absent a basis
for conclusion that one or the other governmental subdivision is
protected from interference because it is "higher" in the governmental hierarchy,1a6 some effort at accommodation of the competing interests seems the most likely approach to achieving an
appropriate solution. Yet, the county's request for a blanket declaration of immunity from the ordinances and its failure to bring
a specific dispute before the court precluded careful assessment of
either the extent of or the justification for the city's interference
with the county's activities or the county's interference with the
city's objectives. Without the facts upon which to base such an
assessment, the court's "all-or-nothing" approach was almost
inevitable. Significantly, the cases in which the municipality's
power has been upheld are those in which an effort has been
made to accommodate the competing interests by careful examination of the importance of the municipal regulation to the city
5T
and its effect upon the other governmental agency involved3
There are, nonetheless, limits to the competence of the judiciary.
Whether, for example, priority should be given to a school board's
interest in locating a school to maximize its own objectives or
to the interest of the municipality in planning land use1 s is a
question with which courts have little competence to deal. Such
questions require legislative action,1 9° not only because the legislature is responsible for the fragmentation of political power which
creates the problem, but because it alone has general responsibility for the welfare of the state's inhabitants.
Miscellaneous
With the exception of cases in which a municipality has at155. Compare Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Ore. 454, 111 Pac. 379, 112 Pac.
402 (1910), discussed in text accompanying note 151 mupra. In that case, the
county was not engaged in activities of concern to the municipality. The
latter could not, as in the Los Angeles case, justify its interference with the
county as necessary to protect itself from incursions by the county.
156. COf. Mayo v. United States, 819 US. 441 (1943); Johnson v. Mary-

land, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).
157. See cases cited note 154 supra.
158. See State v. Ferriss, 304 S.W2d 896 (Mo. 1957).
159. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T Cona §§ 53090-95, enacted after the decision in
Hall v. City of Taft, 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956), which subjects certain state agencies to municipal building and land use regulations.
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tempted to legislate extraterritorially 06 or in a manner seriously
prejudicial to the flow of commerce with a state,' there remain
only a very few instances in which the initiative has been limited
by the judiciary. A recent Rhode Island decision'0 2 holds, contrary to every other case in which the issue has been presented,0 8
that a home rule municipality does not possess licensing power.
Relying on cases in non-home rule jurisdictions, the court reasoned that the power to license was an attribute of sovereignty
which could not be implied as incidental to a grant of power to
enact "local laws relating to [a municipality's] property, affairs,
and government.' ' 64 The decision can be explained only as a
failure by the court to comprehend the effect of the home rule
amendment to the constitution, which had been adopted only
several years earlier.0 " The experience of other states suggests
that a decision so restrictive of municipal power may not be longlived. 60 Thus, an early Missouri decision, State ex rel. Garner v.
Missouri & Kan. Tel. Co., 67 held that a home rule municipality
lacked power to regulate the rates of a local telephone company
solely on the ground that such regulation did not pertain to municipal government. 6 ' Although the decision has not been over160. See text accompanying notes 191-220 infra.
161. See text accompanying notes 221-56 infra.
162. Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 166 A.2d 216 (R.I. 1960).
163. See, e.g., Gaxdenhire v. State, 26 Ariz. 14, 221 Pac. 228 (1928); In
re Hitchcock, 84 Cal. App. 111, 166 Pac. 849 (1917); Sherman, Clay & Co. v.
Brown, 142 Wash. 37, 252 Pac. 137 (1927).
164. Ri.CoNsT. amend. XXVIII, § 2.
165. The court apparently believed that recognition of the licensing power
as within municipal initiative would permit municipalities "to enact licensing
laws for their localities inconsistent with those enacted by the legislature on
the same matters for the rest of the state . . . ." Newport Amusement Co. v.
Maher, 166 A.2d 216, 219 (R.I. 1960). The home rule amendment, however,
expressly limits municipalities to the enactment of "local laws . . . not inconsistent with ... laws enacted by the general assembly. . . ." I. CONST.
amend. XXVIII, § 2. In consequence, recognition of the power asserted by
the municipality would have carried no implication that the legislature lacked
power to supersede the licensing ordinance.
166. See cases discussed notes 106-07 supra.
167. 189 Mo. 83, 88 S.W. 41 (1905).
168. Professor McGoldrick has written that "few matters . . .have been
more conclusively determined than that a general grant of power over municipal or local affairs does not include the right to control the rates and
services of public utilities." McGoLDicK, LAw AND PRAcTIcE OF MUNIcIPAL
HoAm RuLE 1916-1930, at 326 (1933). The cases on which he relies, however,
involve a conflict between municipal and state regulation. Accordingly, they
do not stand for the proposition that utility regulation is beyond the scope
of municipal initiative under home rule. Except in Garner, where that question has arisen unembarrassed by other considerations, municipal power has
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ruled, it is patently inconsistent with other Missouri decisions
and appears to have had no influence in determining the scope
of powers of home rule municipalities in that state.'
Only two other cases restrictive of municipal initiative have
been found. 70 Since each provides an excellent illustration of the
proper role of the judiciary in determining the extent of municipal power under home rule, discussion of these cases is deferred
until consideration of that subject.

PROPOSED LIMI[TATIONS ON THE INITIATIVE
Analysis of Recent Proposals
Judicially imposed limitations on municipal initiative under
a grant of home rule power have not, as the preceding discussion
demonstrates, been frequent or unduly restrictive of municipal
power. Nevertheless, such limitations have occasionally been
imposed. In recent years, commencing with Dean Fordham's
draft of Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal Home
Rule, efforts have been made to formulate the grant of home rule
powers in terms sufficiently comprehensive to extinguish, or at
least considerably narrow, the opportunities for judicial limitation.71 Dean Fordham's proposal is that a home rule municipality
be permitted to "exercise any power or perform any function
which the legislature has power to devolve upon a non-home rule"
municipality.'" The sixth edition of the National Municipal
been sustained. See, e.g., St. Paul Book & Stationery Co. v. St. Paul Gaslight

Co., 130 Armn. 71, 153 N.W. 262 (1915); Denver v. Mountain States Tel. &
Tel. Co., 67 Colo. 225, 184 Pac. 604 (1919). An early Michigan decision held
the regulation of public utilities to be beyond the power of a home rule
municipality, but the decision was based on the Michigan home rule theory
under which the scope of municipal initiative is dependent on legislative definition. City of Kalamazoo v. Titus, 208 Mich. 252, 175 N.W. 480 (1919). See
text accompanying note 106 supra; of. City of El Paso v. El Paso City Lines,
22.7 S.W. 2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
169. See McBAIn, THE LAw AND THE PRACTICE OF MUNICIPAL Ho~N RUIE
190 (1916); Schmandt, Municipal Home Riue in Missouri, 1953 WAs . U.L.Q.
385, 391.
170. State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 181 M nn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915);
Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.. 211 (1925).
171. Fordham, supra note 132, at 138-39; see NATIONAL Muxinuci'AL
LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION 97 (6th ed. 1963). See also AxAsr..
CONST. art. X, § 11.
172. Amxucw Mumcn-A Ass'x, op. cit. supra note 128, § 6. "This devolution of power does not include the power to enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except as an incident -toan exercise of an independent
municipal power, nor does it include power to define and provide for the punishment of a felony." Ibid.
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League's Model State Constitution goes even further; it would
authorize a municipality to "exercise any legislative power or perform any function .... -17' Except for the recent Alaska constitution 1 74 these proposals provide greater power than is granted in
17 5

any state. '

Two primary assumptions underlie the proposals. The first,
which has been discussed previously, 17 involves the undesirability
of fragmenting governmental power. Responsibility for the general welfare cannot, as appears to have been assumed in drafting
the traditional home rule provisions, be neatly divided into areas
of local and general concern. Fulfillment of municipal responsibility toward the local citizenry requires a broad range of powers.
Specification is not only unwieldy, it ignores the obvious truth
that constantly changing conditions require flexibility, a need
which can best be met by permitting municipalities to assume
new powers whenever, in the judgment of those most familiar
173. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 171, art. VIII, §
8.02. The limitations upon the enactment of private and criminal law are the
same as those provided in Dean Fordham's draft.
The broad grant of power is apparently intended only for cities that adopt
a charter in accordance with the provisions of § 8.01(3), but the matter is not
entirely free from doubt. Unlike Dean Fordham's draft, which explicitly confers power only upon "a municipal corporation which adopts a home rule
charter," AMERICAN MuNIcIPAL Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 128, § 6, the Model
State Constitution -states, § 8.02, only that "a . . . city may exorcise" the
powers conferred. The comment to the section indicates, however, that it is

intended to deal only with home rule cities.

NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE,

op. cit. supra art. VIII, § 8.02.
174. ALAsKA CONST. art. X, § 11. Experience under this section has been
too limited to determine whether, ultimately, it will be construed as broadly
as its language seems to require.
175. It has been asserted that the Texas Supreme Court has interpreted
that state's home rule provisions as embodying the formulation proposed by
Dean Fordham and the National Municipal League. See NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGuE, op. cit. supra note 171, at 98; Fordham, supra note 171, at 140.
Since the two proposals differ, as will be seen shortly, both claims cannot be
correct. In fact, neither is correct, since the Texas Supreme Court has had occasion to limit municipal initiative in situations in which it would not have been
permitted to do so under either of the proposals. See City of Arlington v.
Lillard, 116 Tex. 446, 294 S.W. 829 (1927); City of Fort Worth v. Lillard, 116
Tex. 509, 294 S.W. 831 (1927); cf. City of El Paso v. El Paso City Lines, 227
S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Genusa v. City of Houston, 10 S.W.2d 772
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
Dicta in several opinions suggest adoption of the formulation in other
states. See cases cited note 68 supra. The language is, however, inconsistent
with other decisions in these jurisdictions. See City of La Grande v. Municipal
Court, 120 Ore. 109, 251 Pac. 308 (1926); McBAIn, op. cit. upra note 169, at
355-59.
176. See .text accompanying notes 56-59 supra.
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with local problems, the necessity arises. The second assumption
rests upon the indisputable premise that the allocation of governmental power is a political question. Judicial participation in
the resolution of such political questions has, through the years,
been the target of frequent criticism by commentators. 77 Judges,
it has been argued, lack both the training and experience requisite
to wise judgment in such matters. Moreover, the critics continue,
the adjudicative process is not adapted to the solution of such
problems; it places too much reliance upon concept and precedent
and not enough on administrative and practical implications.
Both assumptions would argue more convincingly for the necessity of a reformulation of the grant of home rule power if
experience with judicial limitations upon municipal initiative was
as the critics assume.' 78 Experience, however, is quite to the contrary. Home rule municipalities have not been narrowly limited
to the exercise of power in a preconceived and rigid area of "local
concern." The broad scope which the courts have given municipal initiative has tended to minimize the policy-maling function
of the courts. By and large, there has been judicial acceptance of
policy decisions made at the local level. If the reformulations
served merely to confirm and make explicit the course of judicial
decisions- under traditional provisions, they would, of course, be
unobjectionable. More affirmatively, they would serve the useful
purpose of decreasing the risk of aberrant decisions. Closer analysis suggests, however, that the proposals may go too far in broadening the scope of municipal initiative and removing the courts
from participation in the process of curbing possible abuses of
municipal power.
Recognition that governmental responsibilities are not divisible into areas of "local" and "general" or "statewide" concern
does not compel a conclusion that the municipal council is as
competent as the state legislature with respect to all matters
which may be of concern to the municipality. One might readily
acknowledge the desirability of granting municipal government
the power to govern generally, 17 without conceding that the pro177. See, e.g., CoUNCmI OF STATE Govmm=xs, STATE-LocAL RELATIONS 170 (1946); McGoLncx, op. cit. supra note 168, at 310-12; Walker,
Toward a New Theory of Municipal Home Rule, S0 Nw. UL.REv.571, 575-

78 (1955).
178. Seetext accompanying notes 77-80 supra.
179. Excluding, presumably, at least certain functions such as defense
which by general agreement should be exercised only at "higher" levels of
government. See Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a 'Tro'r"Areal Division of
Governmental Powers, in AREAmm PowE 27, 35 (Mlaass ed. 1959). See also
note 172 supra.
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priety of every exercise of the power is appropriate for decision
at the local level. Awareness of this is reflected in both of the
model home rule provisions, in part by the limitations imposed
upon the enactment of private and criminal law and more pervasively by the broad power which each grants the legislature
to supersede decisions made by municipal governments.'
The
basic question, therefore, involves the role, if any, of the judiciary in the ongoing process of determining the propriety of municipal action. Proceeding from the premise that such decisions
are political, both Dean Fordham and the National Municipal
League have attempted to remove the courts from participation
in the process. The premise does not, however, necessarily lead
to that conclusion. Characterization of the issues as political,
upon which all can agree, does not establish the wisdom or the
necessity of denying the judiciary a role. The question to be answered is not whether an issue is political, for courts are regularly charged with the responsibility of deciding political issues, 181 but whether it is the type of political issue toward the
resolution of which the courts can make a contribution.
Reference has previously been made to the fact that a grant
to home rule municipalities of all powers which the legislature
might confer upon non-home rule municipalities fails to provide
any greater clarity or guidance to the courts than the traditional
formulations of home rule power. 82 The limitations on legislative
power are phrased in essentially the same terms as have usually
been employed to describe the scope of municipal initiative. Under Dean Fordham's proposal, accordingly, the courts would
retain some power to limit municipal initiative. Nevertheless, the
proposed grant would substantially alter the function of the
courts in distributing power between state and municipality.
Even though limitations upon legislative power to delegate authority to municipalities have been phrased in terms similar to
those employed in describing the limits of municipal initiative
180. Under Dean Fordham's proposal the legislature rotains complete
authority over home rule municipalities, subject only -to the classification requirements that § 3 imposes on legislation relating to municipal corporations,
except "with respect to municipal executive, legislative, and administrative
structure, organization, personnel and procedure ....
" AmEnicA
MuNiclPAL ASS'N, op. cit. supra note 128, § 6.
The National Municipal League's draft limits the legislature's power only
by a requirement that it act by "general law." NATIONAL MUNIcIPAL L-auUE,
op. cit. supra note 171, § 8.02.
181. See BLAcu, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT DEmocAcy 29 (1960).

182. See text accompanying notes 68-70 infra.
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under home rule, it has generally been understood that a decision
limiting municipal initiative does not preclude a subsequent
legislative delegation of the necessary authority. m Dean Fordham's proposal would merge these heretofore distinct questions.
Determination of the limits of municipal initiative would turn
not upon the merits of the problem actually before the court,
but upon the resolution of other issues which, in that case, are
only hypothetical.
The implications of the hypothetical question which the
courts would be required to decide, whether the legislature might
delegate the power to a municipality, are vastly different than
the implications of a decision under traditional home rule provisions that a municipality has exceeded the bounds of municipal
initiative. In the latter context, the court's decision amounts to
no more than a suspensive veto. The holding that authority for
the power asserted by the municipality is lacdng can be overcome by the legislature. Under Dean Fordham's proposal, by
contrast, a judicial decision limiting municipal initiative requires
a determination of the limits of governmental power generally.
Only a constitutional amendment would suffice to permit exercise
of the power by the municipality. In a sense, consequently, the
proposed reformulation of municipal power increases the importance of the courts in the process of allocating functions between
state and local government. Although the frequency of judicial
limitation might be somewhat curbed by the clear intention to
permit virtually unlimited municipal initiative, judicial intervention would occur at a far more critical point in the process.
The role of the court would shift from one of providing an opportunity for consideration of the problem by the legislature to that
of final arbiter. While there is ample reason, as subsequent discussion attempts to demonstrate, 8 4 to permit courts to exercise
a suspensive veto over municipal assertions of power, the customary criticisms of judicial participation in the process of distributing power between state and local governments are surely
persuasive that final decision ought not to rest with the courts.
It is true, of course, that under existing law courts are occasionally required to determine the limits of legislative power to
delegate authority to municipalities, but there is a substantial
183. See City of La Grande v. Municipal Court, 120 Ore. 109, 251 Pac.
308 (1926); Newport Amusement Co. v. Maher, 166 A.2d 216 (RI. 1900);
McBAIN, op. cit. supra note 169, at 189. But see Green v. City of Amarillo,
244 S.W. 241 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1922), aff'd on other grounds, 207 S.W.
702 (Tex. Comm'n of App. 1924).
184. See text accompanying notes 221-93 infra.
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difference between the cases in which the issue may now arise
and those in which it would arise under Dean Fordham's proposal. Currently, courts are required to make such a decision only
against the background of an actual legislative determination.
Speculation concerning the conditions which might lead a legislature to devolve the power in question upon a municipality is
unnecessary. The propriety of the delegation is determined in the
light of a prior determination by a legislative body responsible
to the entire state and more representative than the municipal
council 8 5 that the particular power in question may appropriately
be exercised by a municipality. 86 Adjudication under Dean Fordham's proposal would be required even though these conditions
have not been satisfied. Although it would be required to determine the limits of the legislature's power, a court would in fact
sit in judgment only upon the decision of a municipal council.
Yet because of the differing constituencies of the two legislative
bodies, as the model provisions recognize in the power granted
the legislature to overrule decisions made at the municipal level,
the legislature's judgment should be accorded more weight than
that of the council.
The home rule provision of the Model State Constitution
creates essentially the same problems. Although its formulation
of municipal initiative would not require the courts to decide a
hypothetical question in determining the limits of municipal authority, it does equate municipal and legislative power by granting municipalities power to exercise "any legislative power or
perform any function. . . ." As in the Fordham proposal, upon
which it is based,'18 7 reliance is placed exclusively upon the legislature to curb possible abuses of municipal power. A court could
not limit municipal power without limiting the power of the legislature even though the considerations relevant to a determination
of whether the limitations should be imposed may be quite different in the two situations. Both model provisions thus tend to
force the courts to the adjudication of major constitutional questions - limitations on legislative power - rather than permitting decision of minor constitutional questions - limitations on
municipal power - which minimize the extent of judicial circum185. The importance of responsibility to the entire state seems self-evident.
See text accompanying note 194 infra. For the meaning of "representative" in
this context, see text accompanying notes 262-68 infra.
186. See generally Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine
of ConstitutionalLaw, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1898).
187. NATIox Muxcpn'AL LEAGUE, op. cit. supra note 171, at 97.
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scription of legislative power. s8
Conversely, both of the model provisions tend to deny the
judiciary power to curb abuse of municipal authority. A court
sensitive to the limitation on its own competence that is postulated by the separation of powers, would rarely, if ever, hold that
a particular power, however inappropriate for exercise at the
local level, exceeded municipal initiative. To do so would require,
under Dean Fordham's formulation, that the court also be prepared to hold that the legislature could not confer the power upon
a municipality; under the National Municipal League's provision,
the court would be required to go even further and determine
that the power not only was not delegable but that it would
exceed the authority of the legislature as well. The apparent
theory of the proposals is that the legislature can be relied upon
to protect the broader public interest against possible incursions
by municipalities, an assumption which is made explicit in a recent report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 1 9 The Commission recommends a constitutional grant of municipal power essentially similar to that suggested by Dean Fordham and the National Municipal League,
but to mitigate the "problems [which] would arise out of a lack
of responsibility and prudence or from placing local decision
above the general interest" it urges that the grant "should be
preceded by a careful review of affirmative limitations upon the
powers of local government within a State. Such delegation should
occur simultaneously with the enactment of a local code, by which
the State legislature places necessary limitations upon local powers and reserves other powers for the State." 9 0° The question is
whether legislation can carry so large a burden. To answer the
question requires not only an analysis of the areas to which municipal power would extend under the proposals but a comparative assessment of the ability of the courts and the legislature to
cope with the various problems. The wisdom of dealing with possible abuse of municipal power exclusively by legislation is largely
academic if there is no other feasible alternative, i.e., if the dnds
of issues presented are such that the courts can make no contribution to their solution. If, on the other hand, there is a role
which courts are equipped to play, the decision to rely exclusively
188. Of. Frandulter &Hart, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 1A1v.L. REv. 68, 98-106 (1935).
189. U.S. ADvisoaY Coi!'N ON ITTERGOVE M -ETAL
R

TIONS, STATE
CONSTITUTONAL AND STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS UPON THE STRUCTURAL, FUNCTION AL, AND PERSONNL POWERS OF LocAL GovEaNmmNT 72 (1902).

190. Id. at 72-73.
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on legislation deserves closer scrutiny. Analysis of the areas to
which municipal power would extend under the proposals provides, in addition, a convenient framework for consideration of
the limitations which, under existing constitutional provisions,
ought to be placed upon municipal action by the courts in the
absence of legislation.
ExtraterritorialPowers
Students of urban government have frequently and severely
criticized the extreme territorial division of government at the
local level which currently prevails in the United States.'" Fragmentation of the tax base, inefficiency in the provision of services,
inability to regulate land use rationally, and failure to provide
meaningful and effective political processes constitute only a few
items from the list of adverse consequences which flow from the
current pattern of government organization at the local level.
Inevitably, proposals have been forthcoming to remedy or at least
mitigate these evils. Of particular interest here are the proposals
to extend municipal power beyond the territorial limits of the
city.
The authority of the legislature to confer extraterritorial power
upon municipalities is extensive. Legislatures have successfully
granted municipalities unilateral annexation power, authority to
purchase and condemn land or render services beyond their boundaries, and even extraterritorial police power. 0 2 Prima facie, consequently, a grant of power to "exercise any legislative power"
or to "exercise any power . . . which the legislature has power to

devolve upon a non-home rule charter municipal corporation"
confers substantial extraterritorial power.'0 8 Although different
191. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMIENTS, TuE STATES AND TilE
METROPOLITAN PROBLEM (1956); FORDIiAm, A LARGER CONCEPT OF COMMUNITy 3-40 (1956); Wood, A Division of Powers in Metropolitan Areas, in
AREA An POWER 53 (Maass ed. 1959).
1.14(1),
192. See generally 1 ANTJiEAU, MuNicIPAL CORPORATION LAW
5.09-.10 (1962); SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS iN THE METROPOLITAN

§§

AREA (1962); Anderson, The ExtraterritorialPower of Cities, 10 MINN. L.
REv. 475, 564 (1926).

193. The Comment to § 8.02 of the Model State Constitution states that
the power which may be exercised by a municipality under that section is
"limited by its territorial jurisdiction." NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAoUE, op. cit.
supra note 171, at 97. There appears to be no textual justification for this

limitation, unless reliance is placed upon § 8.01(3), which requires the enactment of legislation under which a city may adopt a charter "for its own government." The question is whether the quoted phrase implies the limitation
stated in the comment to § 8.02. Identical language in existing constitutional provisions has not prevented .the exercise of at least certain extrater-
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facets of the power suggest different problems, every extraterritorial exercise of power involves the risk that the interests of the
area affected may not coincide with those of the municipality.
Since the residents of the affected area have no voice in the municipal decision, there is the obvious danger that inadequate attention may be given to their interests. 0 4 Where the assertion of
extraterritorial power involves an exercise of governmental power,
as in the subjection of the adjacent territory to municipal police
regulations, there is the added factor of collision with the fundamental principle of government with the consent of the governed.
Although these considerations need not result in a denial of extraterritorial power in all circumstances, they do suggest the wisdom
of a cautious approach to the grant of such powers, however useful they may be to the municipality.9 5
The broadest extension of municipal power, since it encompasses all other extraterritorial exercise of power, would be authorization to annex surrounding territory by action of the
municipality alone. In view of the legislature's undoubted power
to confer such authority upon a municipality, both Dean Fordham's and the National Municipal League's home rule provisions
might be construed as a constitutional grant of unilateral annexation power to every home rule municipality. However, a closer
reading of the model provisions indicates that the entire question
of boundary adjustment is reserved for legislative control, at
least in the first instance. Section 2 of Dean Fordham's draft
states that "the legislature shall provide by law . . . the methods
by which municipal boundaries may be altered ... ." Somewhat
similar language is contained in Section 8.01 of the Model State
Constitution. If the grant of charter-making authority is construed in the light of these provisions, 9 ' it seems fairly clear that
municipalities would not, under the model provisions, be permitritorial powers. See, e.g., Allison v. City of Phoenix, 44 Ariz. 66, 33 P.2d 927
(1934) (acquisition of land); Fellows v. City of Los Angeles, 151 Cal. 52, 00
Pac. 137 (1907) (acquisition of utility and rendering service).
194. There may, of course, be devices other than participation in the
initial decision through which the residents of the affected area may be
heard and obtain a degree of protection. For example, -the power of Missouri
home rule municipalities to annex adjacent unincorporated territory without
the consent of the residents of the latter area, see note 198 infra, is subject to
a judicial determination of "reasonableness." State v. North Kansas City, 360
Mo. 374, 228 S.W.d 762 (1950). Similarly, a municipality's acquisition and
development of land beyond its boundaries may be subject to a degree of
control by the affected area. See text accompanying notes 216-19 infra. Still
another possibility is legislative reversal of the municipal decision.
195. SENGsTocK, op. cit. supra note 192, at 72.
196. See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra.

694
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ted to exercise unilateral annexation power without prior legislative authorization. 97 The decision to deny such power, which accords with judicial interpretations of existing constitutional home
rule provisions, 19 8 seems unassailable as a matter of policy. Three
distinct interests are directly affected by annexation: the municipality, the territory to be annexed, and the larger area from which
the annexed territory is taken.199 Unilateral annexation subordinates the latter two to the former, depriving them not only of an
opportunity to participate in the decision but of any assurance
that consideration has been given to their welfare. Other difficulties may also arise if the constitutional grant of charter-making
197. This construction is supported by the comment to § 2 of the Fordham draft which states: "there is ground for hesitancy over leaving the subject to municipal control by a direct constitutional devolution of power."
Aim~ricAw MuNiciPAL Ass'N, MODEL CONSTITUTIONAL PnovisioNs roi MuNIcIPAL 1o1 RULE 14 (1953).
198. Since annexation is everywhere governed by statute, the cases in
which home rule is claimed to provide authority for annexation do not clearly
raise the question of the extent of municipal power in the absence of statute.
Consequently, the language of the following decisions, that annexation does
not come within the scope of municipal initiative under home rule, is dicta:
Amish v. City of Phoenix, 36 Ariz. 21, 282 Pac. 42 (1929); People v. City of
Long Beach, 155 Cal. 604, 102 Pac. 664 (1909); Schultz v. City of Upper
Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E2d 218 (1950); Barton v. Stuckey, 121
Okla. 226, 248 Pac. 592 (1916); Thurber v. MeMinnville, 63 Ore. 410, 128 Pac.
43 (1912); State ex rel. Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 773, 31 Pac. 25 (1892).
In Missouri and Texas home rule does constitute the source of municipal
annexation power. In both states, however, the power is expressly conferred
by statute, Mo. Rav. STAT. § 82.090 (1959); TEX. REy. CIV. STAT. art. 1175
(1968), and the courts have not, consequently, been required to decide
whether municipalities might exercise the power without legislative 'authorization. Two commentators, in reliance on State v. North Kansas City, 360 Mo.
374, 228 S.W.2d 762 (1950), have concluded that in Missouri the constitutional grant of initiative authorizes annexation without consent of the area
to be annexed even absent a statute. LIrTTEFIELD, METIooLiTAN AnmA PuonLErs AND MuNicIPAL Howm R=ma 23 (1962); Comment, 19 U. IAr. CITY L.
REv. 186, 187 (1951). Neither the North Kansas City decision nor earlier Missouri cases support this conclusion. They merely establish that the legislature
cannot alter the method of charter amendment specified in the constitution.
In none was the court faced with the issue of whether, in the absence of authorizing legislation, charter amendment is a permissible means of annexing
territory. See McBAiN, op. cit. supra note 169, at 146-49. Professor McBain
concludes that "it would be little short of ridiculous to hold that the grant
of authority to frame a charter included any such power." Id. at 149.
199. Although the assertion of extraterritorial power is less obvious, the
same analysis applies to detachment. Accordingly, there is no greater justification for extension of the initiative to detachment than there is to annexation. See Village of Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148
N.E.2d 921 (1958) (dictum). Contra,Flavel Land Co. v. Leinenweber, 81 Ore.
353, 158 Pac. 945 (1916).
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authority is recognized as a source of annexation power. The alteration of boundaries necessarily involves some adjustment of the
assets and liabilities of the affected areas. Unless the municipality
is permitted to determine these questions also, the imposing task
of adjusting these financial relationships must fall upon the courts.
Related judicially evolved doctrines 20do
not instill confidence in
-0
the likelihood of an equitable solution.
The undesirability of treating annexation as an incident of a
general constitutional grant of charter-maling authority does not
automatically lead to the conclusion that legislative delegation
of such power to municipalities is unwise. The primary argument
against the former is that it fails to take account of relevant interests other than those of the municipality. Legislative consideration of whether to delegate such power to municipalities, on the
other hand, necessarily involves at least a generalized resolution
of the potentially competing interests by a broadly representative
body responsible to and responsible for both the municipality and
the adjacent area.201 And while recognition of the self-executing
power in no way interferes with the legislature's power to provide
a statutory scheme governing the adjustment of financial relationships, enactment of such legislation seems more likely to occur
if municipalities are required to look to legislation as the source
02
of annexation power.
Similar considerations militate against treating extraterritorial
police power as an incident of a general grant of charter-makcing
authority. Unilateral annexation at least brings the residents of
the annexed area within the political community of the municipality. Consequently, though more encompassing, it is less of a
deviation from generally accepted democratic principles than subjection of the adjacent area to the municipality's police regulations. Exercise of the latter power involves, in addition, a substantial risk of conflict with regulations of either another municipality
200. It is generally held that, in the absence of statute, the annexing mu-

nicipality acquires all real property owned by the diminished governmental
subdivision in the annexed territory. The latter, however, is left with all the

liabilities notwithstanding its diminished tax base. 1 Axixau, op. cit. supra
note 192,

§

1.16; SEaNsrocK, ANNExATION: A SOLuTION TO TnE MnrnoPor.i-

T.x AnnA 'RoBLEm

85-88 (1960).

201. Since the wisdom of such legislation is not unique to home rule, extended discussion is beyond the scope of this Article. The arguments advanced
in the text do, however, have an obvious bearing upon the question. See generally Cour'cm OF STATE GovEmmvrs, op. cit. supra note 191, at 25-52;
SExGsTocK, op. cit. supra note 200, at 19-25 passim.
202. Candor compels the admission that neither the Texas nor fissouri
legislature has adopted such legislation.
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exercising extraterritorial power or the political subdivision in
which the adjacent area is located. Protection of the adjacent area
from abuse of municipal power and resolution of conflicting
local regulations might, of course, be accomplished by legislation,
notwithstanding recognition of extraterritorial power flowing from
the grant of home rule. The question, consequently, is whether
the burden of seeking legislation should rest upon the municipality
seeking to exercise extraterritorial power or whether it should
rest upon the residents of the adjacent area. Under existing constitutional provisions, the burden is upon the municipality. 2°3 The
model provisions would impose the burden upon the residents of
the adjacent areas (since only boundary adjustments are excluded
from the extraterritorial power implicit in the authority conferred
upon municipalities). On balance, the former approach seems
preferable. Although the relatively limited use which municipali20 4
ties have made of statutory grants of extraterritorial police
power indicates that the risk of abuse is not great, the departure
from fundamental principles involved in the exercise of extraterritorial police power suggests the desirability of requiring municipalities to justify the necessity for such a departure. The scope
of potential extraterritorial regulation is extremely wide, ranging
from matters in which a municipality has an obvious and direct
interest, say, land use in the area immediately adjacent to its
boundaries, to matters in which its interest is likely to be minimal, as, for example, conduct which may be offensive to public
morality.' 5 Differences may also exist in the impact of various
regulations upon the adjacent area. If the residents of the latter
area are to be denied participation in the establishment of the
controls to which they are subject, they are at least entitled to
a reasonably particularized judgment as to the necessity for the
denial by a legislative body which bears responsibility for their
welfare.
Although the model provisions appear to contemplate that
extraterritorial police power might be exercised by a municipality
under the direct authority of the constitutional grant of power,
the traditional approach could easily be achieved under those
203. In four states the constitutional grant of police power to municipalities is explicitly declared to be exercisable only within their limits. CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 11; IDAHo CONST. art. XII, § 2,; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3; UTAUa

CONST. art. XI, § 5. Even in the absence of such language, the attempted
extraterritorial exercise of police power has been invalidated. City of Duluth
v. Orr, 115 Minn. 267, 132 N.W. 265 (1911).
204. SEWGSTOCK, op. cit. supra note 192, at 55.
205. The range of potential exercise of power is indicated by the compilation of statutory grants of extraterritorial police power in id., at 52-54.
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provisions by enactment of legislation denying municipalities
power to adopt extraterritorial regulations except as specifically
authorized by statute 06 Whichever approach is adopted, however, it seems fairly clear that in this instance the decision to rely
exclusively upon the legislature to define the limits of municipal
power is a correct one. The choices which must be made in determining the scope of permissible extraterritorial regulation, involving primarily considerations of expediency rather than of principle, are beyond the competence of judges,2 0 7 and in this instance,
unlike others to be examined below, reliance upon the legislature
is a feasible alternative. 08
Another aspect of the problem of extraterritorial power is the
authority of home rule municipalities to acquire property, by
purchase or condemnation, or to render services beyond their
boundaries. In a number of home rule jurisdictions the power is
expressly conferred by statute 0 9 or constitutional provision 10
Municipal power in such states is, of course, beyond question.2 1 '
The issue is whether the power should be inferred from a general
grant of charter-making authority. The weight of judicial authority accords with the position adopted in the model provisions, i.e.,
the power may be exercised even in the absence of a specific statutory grant of authority.F' Preliminary analysis supports this
206. Both model provisions authorize the legislature to define the limits
within which home rule powers may be exercised. See note 180 supra.
207. Cf. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARv. L. Rav. 1, 14-16 (1959).
208. See text accompanying notes 224-27 & 276-77 infra. See also text accompanying notes 141-44 supra concerning the feasibility of reliance on the
legislature to deal with the problem of municipal enactment of private law. The
latter problem is primarily one of fitting municipal enactments into the body of
the law, requiring resolution of a myriad of minor issues that are virtually impossible to anticipate in advance of particular controversies. The problems associated with extraterritorial exercise of power, by contrast, fall into a limited
number of categories and their disposition is substantially less likely to interfere with legal relationships created in other contexts.
209. See, e.g., Micr. Co". LAws ch. 117, § 4e (Supp. 1956); MiN. STAT.
§ 410.07 (1961); Tkx. flav. Civ. STAT. art. 1175 (1948).
210. See, e.g., Onro CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 4.
211. See, e.g., City of Pontiac v. Ducharme, 278 Mich. 474, 270 N.W. 754
(1936); City of White Bear Lake v. Leuthold, 172 Mlnn. 255, 214 N.W. 930
(1927); Cameron v. City of Waco, 8 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
212. See, e.g., Allison v. City of Phoenix, 44 Ariz. 66, 33 P.2d 927 (1934);
City & County of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101
(1945); City of Mciflville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451, 109 Pac. 81 (1910)
(alternative holding). The authority of Howenstine has been somewhat weakened by later decisions, City of La Grande v. Municipal Court, 120 Ore. 109,
251 Pac. 308 (1926); State v. Fort of Astoria, 79 Ore. 1, 154 Fac. 399 (1916),
but the case appears never to have been overruled with respect to the limited
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result. The exercise of such power is frequently of substantial importance to the municipality213 and the frequency with which it
has been conferred by legislatures does indicate a general acceptance of municipal action beyond their boundaries by a politically
responsible agency which must be deemed to have a wider perspective than is necessarily to be assumed for the municipality.
Nevertheless, these arguments equally support recognition of
extraterritorial police power as an incident of a general grant of
charter-making authority, a conclusion which has previously been
rejected. There is, however, an important difference in the impact
of the municipality's action upon the adjacent area. Subjection
of the adjacent area to municipal police regulation involves the
exercise of uniquely governmental power. The impact upon the
adjacent area resulting from municipal land acquisition or rendition of services, on the other hand, is no different than would be
the impact of similar activities engaged in by private parties. " 4
General principles of democratic theory are, therefore, of little
relevance with respect to this aspect of extraterritorial power.
Extraterritorial acquisition of property or rendition of services may, nevertheless, raise a quite different problem: the possibility of conflict with the policies of the local government exercising general jurisdiction over the area in which the municipality
is engaged in extraterritorial activity.2 1 If the adjacent area is
issue of whether a charter city may condemn land lying beyond its boundaries without statutory authority. But of. Riggs v. Grants Pass, 66 Ore. 226,
134 Pac. 776 (1913).
The Michigan Supreme Court held prior to the enactment of the authorizing legislation cited in note 209 supra that home rule cities lacked extraterritorial condemnation power. City of Detroit v. Oakland Circuit Judge, 237
Mich. 446, 212 N.W. 207 (1927). This decision may be reconciled with the
contrary decisions discussed in the previous paragraph by reference to the
Michigan theory of home rule. See text accompanying note 106 supra.
213. City of McMinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451, 462-64, 109 Pac. 81,
85-86 (1910); McGoLnRicx, op. cit. sui~ranote 168, at 178-81.
214. It should be apparent that no effort is being made to introduce the
governmental-proprietary distinction as a tool for the resolution of these
problems. The impact of a municipal activity on the adjacent area obviously
has no relationship to the factors that might lead to placing it in one or the
other category for purposes of determining tort liability.
215. Exercise of the power of eminent domain extraterritorially, since it
does involve a power uniquely dependent upon governmental authority, may
raise some problems in this connection. But the frequency with which the
power has been delegated, not only to municipalities but to private enterprises, suggests that there is not the same necessity for caution as exists with
respect to extraterritorial police power. Cf. MCBAiN, THE LAW AND THS PRACTICE OF MuICIPAL HOME RuLE 430-31 (1916).

216. The problem was posed by Professor McGoldrick in discussion of
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permitted to regulate the activity to the same degree as it might
regulate similar private activity, recognition of extraterritorial
power creates no special problems for the adjacent area. Literal
application of the model provisions would, however, appear to
preclude such regulation, at least in the absence of explicit legislative authorization. -17 And although no cases directly in point
have been found, the prevailing rule in an analogous situation is
that, absent legislative authorization, one agency of local govern21
ment does not have power to regulate the activities of another. 8
In this context, consequently, the grant of virtually unlimited
initiative to home rule municipalities means that, in the absence
of legislation, there is a complete subordination of the interests
of the adjacent area to those of the municipality. If, on the other
hand, municipalities are, in the absence of enabling legislation,
to be denied power to engage in extraterritorial activity or are
permitted to engage in such activity only subject to regulation
by the adjacent area, the interests of the municipality are subordinated to those of the adjacent area. It seems unlikely that
any one of the three rules will necessarily yield the best result
with respect to all of the potential conflicts. What is required,
as was argued in the previous discussion involving the similar problem of the power of a home rule municipality to regulate the activities of other governmental agencies within its
boundaries, is an accommodation of the competing interests?' 9
For the reasons advanced at that point, problems such as these
call for solution by the legislature, but if the legislature has failed
to deal with the problem, as is reasonably to be anticipated with
the decision in City of Mcinnville v. Howenstine, 56 Ore. 451, 109 Pac. 81
(1910), which upheld the power of a home rule city, in the absence of statutory authority, to condemn certain 6prings lying beyond its borders. "In the
instant case it may well be, from all that appears, that the extramural condemnation affected individuals and not a community. In the populous East
it is hard to imagine a situation where a community would not be involved.
In which case may we pose the query: When shall the Tight of one community to work out its own existence yield to the desires, or, shall we say,
necessity of a neighboring community?" McGoLwmcx, L.&w AxD PnAcTXcr op
MuNiciA. Hois RuLE 1916-1930, at 180 (1933).
217. In other words, if a home rule municipality may exercise any power
which the legislature might delegate to a non-home rule municipality, then
presumably it can engage in extraterritorial activity free of regulation, since
that might have been authorized by the legislature. The formula leads to a
logical impasse when the adjacent area is also entitled to exercise home rule
powers, since it is plain that the legislature might have authorized extraterritorial activity either free of regulation by the adjacent area or only subject
to such regulation.
218. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 155--59 supra.
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respect to at least some of the conflicts which may arise, there
seems little justification for forcing upon the courts a mechanistic solution which fails to take account of the intensity of the
competing interests.2 °
ExtraterritorialImpact of Intramural Legislation
Recent reevaluation of municipal home rule is primarily a result of increasing awareness that the powers exercised by municipal governments wholly within their boundaries may have consequences in surrounding areas. Although the problem is not
unique to metropolitan areas, it is most acute there, and the
growth of such areas has tended to focus attention on the need
for an institutional framework in which decisions concerning the
exercise of governmental power are likely to be based upon a
consideration of all of the affected interests. Recognition of this
need is reflected in the model home rule provisions by the minimal restrictions imposed upon the legislature's power to limit
municipal initiative. The effect of these provisions is to confer
upon the legislature primary responsibility for the distribution
of power between the state and its political subdivisions or among
the subdivisions, much as recent constitutional doctrines have imposed upon Congress primary responsibility for managing the
federal system.221 Unlike Congressional responsibility, however,
the legislature's responsibility under the model provisions is exclusive. State courts are denied the power historically exercised
both by them and by the United States Supreme Court of invalidating local action which, although not in conflict with legislation
enacted by the "higher" level of government, appears to the court
220. Other, perhaps less important, problems of extraterritorial power

may also arise. See, e.g., Almquist v. City of Biwabik, 224 Minn. 503, 28
N.W.2d 744 (1947) (whether charter can provide that municipality and surrounding town may constitute a single election and assessment district); City
of Collinsville v. Brickey, 115 Okla. 264, 242 Pac. 249 (1925) (validity of
charter provision affecting municipal tort liability when applied to damages
sustained beyond municipal boundaries). The difficulty of anticipating such
cases brings to mind the admonition of Professor Oliphant, which, although
made in another context, has an obvious relevance in assessing tho wisdom
of the broad principles laid down in the model provisions: "The decision of
a particular case by a thoughtful scholar is to be preferred to that by a
poorly trained judge, but the decision of such a judge in a particular case is
infinitely to be preferred to a decision of it preordained by some broad 'principle' laid down by the scholar when this and a host of other concrete cases
had never even occurred to him." Oliphant, A Return to Stare Deciisi, 14
A.BA.J. 159 (1928).
221. See Henkin, Some Reflections on Current ConstitutionalControversy.
109 U. PA. L. Ruv. 637, 638-46 (1961).
222. See text accompanying notes 171-73 supra.
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inconsistent with the welfare of the larger political community.2-

Exclusive reliance upon the legislature to control intramural
municipal legislation adversely affecting surrounding communities poses several difficulties which are not involved in exclusive
reliance upon the legislature to control the exercise of extraterritorial power. The problems associated with extraterritorial exercise of power fall into a limited number of categories. Accordingly,
they can, for the most part, be foreseen by the legislature, thus
maling it possible to comply with the cautionary recommendation of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.F4 A similar degree of foresight seems unattainable in connection with the extraterritorial impact of intramural legislation.
Virtually every substantive power exercised by municipalities there is a temptation to say every power without qualification - may, under appropriate circumstances, have an impact upon
surrounding areas. Legislative review of the possible uses of
such power with a view toward imposition of limitations necessary to protect the general welfare is, of course, desirable. But
in view of the broad range of powers exercised by municipalities,
the various ways in which they are exercised, and the continuously changing circumstances which affect the extent of extraterritorial impact, the ability of the legislature to foresee all of
the potential problems is extremely doubtful. A related consideration is that the relatively narrow impact of many local measures
incompatible with the general welfare makes it difficult for the
legislature to assume the primary responsibility for policing local
action. Such measures do not arouse sufficient general interest to
overcome legislative inertia' 2 26

Lack of foresight and legislative inertia are not the only obstacles to exclusive reliance upon the legislature for protection of
the general welfare against possible incursions by municipalities.
The literature of local government has been so largely concerned
with freeing municipalities of legislative control that little attention has been given to pressures creating a local bias in the
legislature. Nevertheless, there is strong evidence that legislative
control has not, by and large, resulted in subordinating local interests to the interests of the larger community, be it the state,
the region, or the metropolitan area. Imposition of a requirement
223. Dean Fordham' s draft, as noted previously, creates an undefined
area in which power may be exercised by the legislature but not by a municipality. See text accompanying notes 182-8 supra.
224. See text accompanying note 190 supra.
2-5. See note 259 ifra.
226. BIcKEm, Tim LEAST DANGEROUS BRAxcH 230 (1902).
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of concurrent majorities in annexation proceedings and authorization of land-use planning by each little hamlet in total disregard of the general welfare, both too common to require the
citation of particular statutes, are perhaps the most familiar examples of the legislature's local bias, but other examples abound.
The reason for the local bias of the legislators is not difficult to
determine: It is inherent in an areal basis of representation. The
legislature may have responsibility for the welfare of the entire
state, but each legislator is responsible only to his own constituency. When the interests of the larger community conflict with
the interests or desires of his constituents, there is inevitable
27
pressure for the legislator to favor the latter
The inherent limitations of legislative oversight suggest that
there may be a role for the courts in the protection of the larger
community against municipal parochialism. Although the ad hoc
and limited character of judicial intervention precludes any possibility that over-all "solutions" can be achieved through this
device alone, partial reliance upon the courts does offer several
advantages. The institution of lawsuits by individuals disadvantaged by municipal legislation provides an opportunity for
continuous, if nonetheless episodic, review of such legislation to
determine its consistency with the welfare of the larger community. In discharging this responsibility, the courts have the
advantage of comparative freedom from local pressures. Equally
important, issues almost invariably come before the courts in
relatively concrete circumstances, permitting somewhat more
particularized judgments than are likely to be made by the legislature. 228 In the long run, this may permit greater flexibility and
adaptability to changing circumstances - a dominant purpose of
the model provisions 229 - than would reliance upon the legislature for the formulation of statutory limitations upon municipal
initiative.
Generalized concepts such as "the welfare of the larger community" or "the general welfare" are of little help in deciding
particular cases. Subprinciples are obviously required if the courts
are to make an intelligible contribution to resolution of the myriad
issues raised by a broad - though not unlimited - grant of initiative to municipalities. Strangely - particularly in view of the
227. Cf. WECHSLER, TnE POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS OF FEDERALISM IN PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw 49, 54-56, 78-82 (1901); WOOD,
SUBURBIA 237-42 (1958); Huntington, The Founding Fathers and the Divisaiof of Powers,in AREA A PoWER 150, 193-96 (Maass ed. 1959).
228. See text accompanying notes 141-44 supra.
229. AMERICAN MUNICIPAL Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 197, at 20-21.
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close analogy to the commerce clause0 0° - state courts have done
little to formulate such principles or to limit municipal initiative
in the interests of the larger community, even though under virtually all existing home rule provisions the courts do have power
to invalidate municipal legislation quite apart from a conflict with
state statutes.al The reports do, nevertheless, contain several
cases in which the courts have limited municipal initiative for this
reason and a somewhat larger number in which they ought to have
done so or at least have given consideration to that possibility.
The analogy to the commerce clause suggests an obvious starting point for the development of principles by which the courts
may limit municipal initiative which is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the interests of the larger community. In City of
A lington v. Lillard, 2 for example, the Texas Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance enacted by a home rule municipality
which, in effect, prohibited "vehicles for hire" from passing
through the city. Although the decision rests in part upon the
inconsistency of the ordinance with state legislation, it appears
to rest also upon the principle that the grant of home rule power
may not be used to obstruct the flow of commerce within the
state.sa Similarly, municipal legislation which discriminates
230. See Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power-Revised Versio, 47 CoLum L. lRzv. 547 (1947).
21. The language of the home rule provisions, except in Alaska where
the exercise of "all legislative powers" is authorized, AIsKA CONsT. art. X,
§ 11, is generally well adapted to permitting the courts to consider the impact
of municipal legislation on the welfare of the state as a whole. See text accompanying notes 63-76 supra.
232. 116 Tex. 446, 294 S.W. 829 (1927).
233. See also City of Fort Worth v. Tillard, 116 Tex. 509, 204 S.W. 831
(1927); City of Fort Worth v. MeCaslin, 116 Tex. 513, 294 S.W. 834 (1927)
both invalidating an ordinance requiring "vehicles for hire" to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity as a condition precedent to use of the
streets and highways within the municipality. Cf. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267
U.S. 307 (1925).
In Village of Perrysburg v. Ridgway, 108 Ohio St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (19O3),
the court, in reliance on the home rule amendment to the Ohio constitution, upheld an ordinance which, although not barring through traffic, prohibited
motor buses from starting or stopping within the municipal limits. The extraterritorial impact of the ordinance was ignored by a majority of the court,
but three judges dissented on precisely that ground:
The minority of this court do not deny the right of a municipality to
control the use of its streets, or to license motor buses, where these
regulations are reasonable and not arbitrarily adopted; but we do deny
the right of a municipality to extend its powers beyond municipal
limits, to throttle state functions, or to prohibit the use of the state
highways for general commerce.
Id. at 260-61, 140 N.E. at 599. The Perrysburg and subsequent related Ohio
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against nonresidents would appear to be beyond the permissible
scope of home rule power. Licensing regulations, although they
frequently serve a legitimate purpose and undoubtedly come
within a grant of home rule power,234 are particularly susceptible
to such abuse.23 5 The City of Palo Alto, for example, imposed a
license fee upon every laundry doing business within its limits,
the amount of the fee varying with the number of persons employed at the plant. In Ferranv. City of Palo Alto,230 a suit to
restrain enforcement of the licensing ordinance was commenced
by the owner of a laundry located in an adjacent city. The plaintiff asserted that since less than two percent of his gross receipts
were obtained from business within Palo Alto, the effect of the
ordinance was to impose a tax upon him for business outside the
city and to place him at a competitive disadvantage with laundries primarily engaged in soliciting business within the city.
Judgment for the plaintiff was granted on these grounds.23T The
implicit premise underlying the decision is that a municipality
may not enact a protective tariff for the benefit of local business.2 3 s Unless home rule is to become the vehicle for "balkanizing" the economy of the state, that principle and the principle
underlying Lillard seem beyond dispute.
More difficult problems are posed when municipal parochialism
is less blatant. Thirty years ago McGoldrick could write that "the
regulation of building and of the use of urban real estate is a
phase of the police power which is of particular interest to cities
and one which would seem to be peculiarly local and intramural
in operation and effect.1 211 Whatever validity that view may once
decisions are discussed in Fordham, Home Rule Powers in Theorj and Practice, 9 OHIO ST. LJ. 18, 55-57 (1958).
234. See text accompanying notes 162-65 supra.
235. See MoTr, Hovmm RULE FOR AiERICA'S CITIEs 41 (Am. Mun. Ass'n
Urban Action Series No. 101, 1949).

236. 50 Cal. App. 2d 374, 122 P.2d 965 (1942).
237. See also In re Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 176 Pac. 449 (1918), in which thc
court invalidated a licensing ordinance imposing an inspection fec computed
by reference to the distance of the laundry plant from the inspector's oflice.
Since the mileage allowance was disproportionately high in comparison to the
inspector's travel expenses, the court found that the effect of the ordinance
was to discriminate unreasonably against laundries located at a distance from
the city. The court rested its decision on a provision of the state constitution prohibiting the grant of "privileges or immunities which, upon the same
terms, shall not be granted to all citizens," but that ground seems less persuasive than the one adopted in Ferran.
238. Cf. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389 (1952);
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 849 (1951).
289. McGoLDRaICK, op. cit. supra note 216, at 884.
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have had,2 40 at the present time there is an increasing awareness
that municipal land use policies, particularly in metropolitan
areas, do have a substantial impact upon surrounding communities . 4 With rare exception, however, judges have not explicitly
considered that impact in determining the validity of a particular exercise of power.
One consequence of this omission has
been the general failure to separate the question of whether a
particular regulation exceeds municipal power from the quite different question of whether the regulation exceeds the power of
government generallyY4 3 Yet, as Professor Mishkln has pointed
out in a related context, the justification for judicial deference to
legislative judgments is far less compelling in connection with
the former question than it is in connection with the latter: "The
rationale behind the presumption of validity generally is that
political processes are adequate to assure representation of affected interests in the legislature and that, therefore, the court
should not 'substitute its judgment' for that of the democratically chosen and responsible body."2 44 By hypothesis the rationale
is not equally applicable to the category of municipal legislation
under discussion at this point.
Awareness that affected interests often are not represented
240. Compare, e.g., Bettman, The Decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Eucid Village Zoning Case, I U. CInc. L. Irv. 18-,
189-90 (1927).
241. See, e.g., Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning and the Apartment
Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1079-91 (1963); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. Rv. 515 (1957). But of. Moi'r, op.
cit. supranote 2M5, at 40-41.
The problem is not, of course, unique to home rule municipalities. Traditions of local autonomy have combined with broad enabling legislation to
permit counties, townships, and the smallest villages to exercise a degree of
initiative virtually coextensive with that which, in the absence of such legislation, would have been possessed only by home rule municipalities. One consequence of the legislation is that the courts have not generally been required
to determine whether the power of home rule municipalities to enact land-use
regulations is derived from the grant of home rule or from the enabling legislation. In principle, the grant of home rule, which includes the police power
and the power of eminent domain, should suffice; and the cases, so far as they
go, generally -upport that conclusion. See McGoLnacn, op. cit. supra note 216,
at 334-38; Crawford, Home Rule and Land Use Control, 13 W. Rs.L. Itm.
702 (1962). But see note 270 infra.
2. See Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 241, at 1079-91; Haar, supra
note 241.
- 248. See Mlshkin, Are the Established Legal Principles of Zoning Valid
and Adequate for Current Conditions of Rapid Metropolitan Growth and
Urban Redevelopment?, Municipal L. Service Letter, Jan. 1960, p. 6.
244. Id. at 3. See also Thayer, supra note 186, at 28; Williams, Planning
Law and Democratic Living, 20 LAw & CorN'. Pnon. 317, 346 (1955).
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in the municipal council and, consequently, that courts may jus-

tifiably limit municipal initiative in situations where identical

state legislation would be upheld,24 obviously does not provide
a simple solution for the manifold problems which may be brought
before the courts. Other factors must also be considered. Ultimately, a judgment must be made as to relative weights of the
municipality's interest and other affected interests.240 Concededly,
such judgments are difficult for courts. Frequently they lack the
information necessary to a fully informed decision. There may be
insufficient consensus as to the scale on which interests are to be

weighed. Nevertheless, guides to decision are not entirely wanting. Some guidance may be obtained by reference to enabling

legislation for non-home rule municipalities. The absence of legislation authorizing exercise of a power cannot, of course, be treated
as conclusive without depriving home rule of all its meaning, 417
but if the legislature has authorized exercise of the power in question or similar powers by non-home rule municipalities that would
48
2
seem to settle the matter in favor of home rule municipalities.

Similarly, some weight may be given to the permissibility vel non
of a state exercising the power under the federal constitution. 49
If the national interest precludes exercise of the power by a state,

it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a municipality
would nonetheless be permitted to exercise the power under its
home rule authority.2 50

245. State legislation might take either of two forms: directly imposing
the regulation or specifically authorizing municipalities to do so. In either
event, a balancing of municipal and other interests would be effected by a
representative body responsible to the affected interests. Of course, legislative
concern with a particular municipal exercise of power will vary inversely with
the breadth of the authorization. The court will then face the issue of whether
it may justifiably determine that the legislation in question does not authorize
that use. See Mishkin, supra note 243.
246. E.g., compare South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938), with Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761
(1945).
247. See text accompanying note 105 supra.
948. Dean Fordham's draft recognizes this principle by providing that "a
home rule charter municipal corporation shall, in addition to its home rule
powers and except as otherwise provided in its charter, have all the powers
conferred by general law upon municipal corporations of its population class."
Amic.r MuiciPxrAL Ass'WN, MonEL CONSTITUTONAL PROVISIONS FOUIMUN cIPAL Homm RULE § 6 (1953); see Fordham, Home Rule-AMA Model, 44
NAT'LMumc. REV. 137 (1955).
949. Of. Dooley v. City of Detroit, 370 Mich. 194, 218-20, 121 N.W.2d
724, 736 (1963).
250. Of course, if the adverse effect of the municipal regulation extends
beyond the boundaries of the state, the regulation would fall under the con-
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In the absence of such guides there is no escape from the neces-

sity of attempting to weigh the competing interests. Taxation of
nonresidents on the basis of income earned within the municipality,

as the Michigan Supreme Court recently held, is permissible because it "is not unreasonable to assume that . . . [it] fairly

reflects the extent to which municipal services and protection
are enjoyed by the taxpayer. 251 In other contexts, the interest
of the municipality may be entitled to less weight. As others
have demonstrated, municipal regulations establishing minimum
dwelling size unrelated to health,"52 unreasonably low density

regulations253 the total exclusion of trailers from a municipal-

ity,254 and a host of other familiar regulations - 55 do have an ad-

verse impact upon surrounding communities which is not adequately balanced by legitimate municipal interests. The inevitable
element of judicial discretion involved in allowing courts to thus
limit municipal initiative plainly involves the risk that courts

may lay down rules which are too restrictive. An assessment of
the risk must, however, take into account the reluctance which

courts have thus far displayed to limit municipal initiative and
the possibility of recourse to the legislature for restoration of the
power denied by the courts. Some account must also be taken
of Justice Holmes' warning:
I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost the
power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think the Union would
be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of
the several States. For one in my place sees how often a local policy
prevails with those who are not trained to national views and how
often action is2 56taken that embodies what the Commerce Clause was
meant to end.

merce clause, whether or not it was permissible under state law. See, e.g.,
Dean AM Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); International Motor
Transit Co. v. City of Seattle, 141 Wash. 194, 251 Pac. 120 (1926).
251. Dooley v. City of Detroit, 370 Mich. 194, 207, 121 N.W.2d 724, 730
(1963). See also Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E-2d 250
(1950).
252. Haar, Wayne Township Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67
HARv. L. Rnv. 986 (1954); Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne
Township Case, 66 Hav. L. Ruv. 1051 (1953); Horack & Nolan, How Small
a House?- Zoning for Minimum Space Requirements, 67 HAry. L. 11Ev. 907
(1954).

253. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 241, at 1079-85; Mishkin, supra
note 243.
254. Vickers v. Township Comm'n, 87 NJ. 2S2, 253, 181 A.2d 120, 149

(1962) (dissenting opinion).

255. WooD, op. cit. supra note 227, at 217-21.
256. Speech by Justice Holmes to the Harvard Law School Association of
New York, February 15, 1913, in Lumma-,
THm MDn ., FADH or JusTicE
Hoiams 390 (1951).
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Protectionof Basic Values
The
respect
tion is
lament

demand for local autonomy has been most insistent with
to those matters as to which the impact of municipal acthought to be confined to local residents. Witness the
of one municipal official:

What I cannot understand is why the people of any city should not
be permitted to govern themselves and experiment as they choose
with plans or projects consistent with our form of government, when
2 7
such action will not affect other cities or towns but only themselves. 6

Any attempt to respond to the question confronts as an initial
obstacle the further question of whether there are any municipal
activities which affect only local residents. Reference has already
been made to the difficulty of defining an area of municipal power
which lacks any extraterritorial impact.5 5 Under appropriate
circumstances even local government structure and personnel
policies may be of concern to nonresidents. 5 Plenary legislative
power to limit municipal initiative may, perhaps, be justified on
this ground alone. The problem here, however, is to determine
the circumstances in which a court may justifiably limit municipal
initiative. Even though every municipal ordinance or charter
provision may have some adverse impact on nonresidents, there
257. Address by Devin, Annual Meeting of the Association of Washington
Cities, June 10, 1949, quoted in Comment, 29 WAsH. L. Rav. 295 (1954). See
also MoTT, op. cit. supra note 241; Walker, Toward a New Theory of MunicipalHome Rule, 50 Nw. UL. Rsv. 571 (1955).
258. See text accompanying note 225 supra.
259. The structure of municipal government has generally been regarded
as a matter of uniquely local concern. The idea is so deeply imbedded that
even Dean Fordham's draft provides that "charter provisions with respect to
municipal executive, legislative and administrative structure ... arc of
superior authority to statute .... " A MEICAN MuNIcu'AL Ass'N, op. cit.
supra note 248, § 6. Yet, there may be circumstances in which the surrounding area has an important interest in the structure of municipal government.
Commentators have emphasized, for example, the critical role of the central
&
city mayor in the solution of metropolitan area problems. BAipnF
GRODZINS, GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING IN METROPOLITAN AnEAs 158-06 (1958).
Adoption of a weak mayor form of government may have an important effect
upon the ability of the mayor to fulfill this role.
Similarly, one commentator, in urging "that local standards should be
set locally for those things which are of local concern" has argued that the
proper function of state or regional standards is to set "minimum standards,
rather than . . .preventing a local jurisdiction from setting standards too
high. The need is for a floor, not a ceiling!" O'Harrow, Comments, Municipal
L. Service Letter, Jan. 1960, p. 6. But in the context of the problem to which
these comments were addressed, that of local power to establish minimum lot
size, municipal freedom to determine the "ceiling" may have repercussions in
the entire region. See notes 252-55 supra.
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are numerous areas in which the impact is so remote or is sufficiently counterbalanced by the interests of the municipality that
a court could not justifiably invalidate the ordinance or charter
provision on that ground alone. Since the discussion thus far has
attempted to justify judicial limitation of municipal initiative on
the basis of the inadequacy of political processes to protect interests not represented in the municipal council, the question may
fairly be raised whether the courts should not be excluded from
the process of defining the scope of municipal power under home
rule when the power asserted has such limited extraterritorial
impact.
It may be helpful to recognize at the outset that the case for
municipal freedom from judicial supervision is most persuasive
when the impact of local programs is confined to local residents.
The desirability of enabling municipalities to govern generally, -"6
the consequent inability of courts to define subjects of insufficient local interest to permit exercise of the initiative, and the
political responsibility of the municipal governing body to affected interests combine to suggest that the municipal council
should be as free as the state legislature - i.e., subject only to
constitutional restrictions upon the exercise of all government
power-to identify problems and experiment with solutions.
And yet, the relatively greater freedom with which courts traditionally have examined the propriety of an exercise of municipal
power 8 1 suggests at least that there is need for more careful consideration of the wisdom of equating the municipal council with
the state legislature so far as judicial review is concerned.
The plea for unlimited municipal initiative (so long as there
is no extraterritorial impact and general constitutional limitations
are observed) conjures up visions of local democracy deeply
rooted in American political ideology. From Jefferson to Eisenhower it has been argued that local citizens, with first-hand
260. See text accompanying notes 34-62 supra.
261. A variety of legal doctrines have developed over the years which

tend to permit courts to exercise greater control over municipal action than
is customarily exercised over action of the state legislature. On the substan-

tive level, and in the absence of home rule, Dillon's rule and the doctrine of

reasonableness, both of which are applicable only to municipalities, serve this
purpose. See notes 26, 37, & 1.17 supra. Existing home rule provisions have

narrowed the opportunities for judicial review of municipal legislation, but
since the grant of power is commonly confined to "local" or "municipal"

affairs, an area of judicial discretion still exists. See text at notes 68-76 supra.
In both traditional and home rule jurisdictions, procedural doctrines, such
as liberal "standing" requirements, also serve to increase the role of the courts.

See Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 H]Auv. L.
Rlxv. 1265 (1961).
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knowledge of local conditions and directly concerned with local
problems, are best able to determine local needs and devise workable solutions. Other values are also associated with the "grassroots" ideology: opportunity for citizen participation in government and avoidance of the threats to liberty posed by "big government." At least since Madison, however, there have been
warnings that local democracy may also be destructive of important values. The municipal council is not necessarily the
equivalent of the state legislature even though the impact of its
actions is wholly intramural.
The argument of Federalist X is of particular relevance, for
it suggests that a power which might be exercised by the legislature may reasonably be denied a municipal council because,
for certain purposes, the municipality's political processes are
less adequate than those at the state level.202 In particular, majority excesses may pose a greater danger at the local level than
at "higher" levels of government where the larger number of
persons and hence the greater number of interests makes it less
likely that a group actuated by a single interest will be able to
run roughshod over a minority. Numbers, moreover, are not the
only protection provided by a reservation of certain decisions
for "higher" levels of government. The risk of precipitate majority
action is increased by the existence -of homogeneous population
groupings, the likelihood of which is, of course, greater at the
local level. 2 " There may, accordingly, be compelling reasons why
262. THE FEDMALIST No. 10, at 60-61 (Modern Library ed.) (Madison).
Although directed primarily at the advantages of the Constitution over the
Articles of Confederacy, the argument is plainly relevant to the distribution
of power within a state and was so applied by Madison. Id. at 62. See generally HUNTINGTON, Op. cit. supra note 233, at 179-4200.
263. "Population is tending to be increasingly distributed within metropolitan areas along economic and racial lines." ADvIsonY Conmm'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL

RELATIONS,

GOVERNMENT

STRUCTURE,

ORGANIZATION

AND

PLANNING IN METROPOLITAN ARAs 7 (1961). Central cities have increasingly
become the place of residence of non-whites, lower income workers, the elderly
and younger couples. Ibid. In suburbia, there is a tendency toward differen-

tiation among communities on the -basis of income, race, ethnic origins and
a variety of other factors. See WOOD, op. cit. upra note 23, at 114-25.
There are, obviously, important differences among municipalities which
are submerged by general reference to a term which describes only a legal
status and, consequently, lumps together all entities which share that status.

The risk of precipitate majority action by a homogeneous group motivated by
a single interest is far greater in a small municipality than it is in the large
urban center with a population in excess of that of many states. If home
rule were limited to the latter municipalities, the problems dealt with in this
section of the Article might be substantially eliminated.
Additional arguments may also be made for limiting home rule to larger
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a court should not be required to pay the same degree of deference to ordinances or charter provisions as to statutes enacted
by the state legislature. The issue is not, as Professor Walker has
attempted to pose it, whether local citizens are assumed to be
less wise when acting locally than when they are acting at the
state level,'a rather, it is whether political processes at the local
level are adequate to achieve or protect the basic community
values 65 which determine the appropriate distribution of governmental power within the state 66 To the extent that local political
processes are inadequate to secure these values, the courts may be
able to ma nimize community values by shifting the level of decision from municipal to state government. It-is for this reason that
a court, contrary to Mr. Mott's suggestion;F67 may justifiably deny
a municipality' power to enact 'higher" - i.e., more restrictive
-moral
standards than are established by state law. Although
the state may have no "interest in lowering the moral tone of any
area,"I s there is a community interest in maximizing liberty
cities. Experience demonstrates that there is a direct relationship between

the size of municipalities and the likelihood that they will avail themselves
of -thepower conferred by a grant of home rule, -thelarger the municipality
the greater the chance that it will have made use of the authority. See MoTr,
op. cit. suypra note 241, at e7; Fordham, supra note 289, at 20. The failure of

most smaller municipalities to exercise their charter-making authority reflects the fact that they rare less likely khan larger municipalities -toneed such
power; their problems are not as -likely to be unique and thus are more susceptible of -handling by general legislation. Smaller municipalities, moreover,
are likely to have greater difficulty in marshalling the -human and material
resources necessary to framing a charter. See Fordham, The West Virginia
Municipal Home Rule Proposal, 38 W. VA. L.Q. 235, 246-47 (1932). Nevertheless, a majority of the constitutional provisions do not limit chartermaking authority to municipalities of a specified size, and only two states,
New Mexico and Washington, limit such authority to municipalities with a
population in excess of 20,000.
264. Walker, supra note 257, at 576.
265. There is an obvious lack of precision in the phrase "basic community
values" and in similar phrases employed -hereafter. An approach to the iden-

tification of these values is set forth in the text accompanying notes 28&-93
infra.
266. See Maass, Divisim of Powers: An Areal Analysis, in AnE. A Pow9 (Ma-ass ed. 1959): "It is to help realize the basic objectives or values
of a political community that governmental power is divided. Thus, division
of powers, like government institutions generally, is instrumental of community values, and the form of division at any time should, and likely will,
reflect the values of that time." But cf. Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a
ER

"Proper" Areal Division of Governmental Powers, in AnnA A-.% Powma 27,
29-80, 33-3 (Maass ed. 1959).
267. Morr, op. cit. supra note e41, at 41.
268. Ibid. Similarly, Mr. Mott has argued that "to suggest that the people of a locality are not good judges of the services they need is to reject
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which may be threatened by allowing local majorities to impose

their own conception of morality upon local dissidents.
The argument is occasionally made that the existence of constitutional guarantees, enforceable by the courts, is adequate to
protect individuals or minorities against the oppressive use of

local power. 6 Some measure of protection is, of course, provided

by constitutional restrictions upon the power of all government,

but exclusive reliance upon these guarantees poses troublesome
questions. Is it wise to increase the risk of constitutional deci-

sions restrictive of individual freedom or contrary to minority
interests solely at the instance of a local majority which well may

not be representative of the larger community? Conversely, is
there not a danger that if courts are limited to general constitutional guarantees in protecting individuals or minorities from
local majorities, precedent will be established which may impede
governmental action if the -timecomes that the larger community,

as represented in the state legislature, determines that the general welfare requires the interference with individual or minority
interests? There is, of course, a possibility that courts might adopt
a variable standard of constitutional interpretation under which

the weight accorded a legislative judgment would be partially
dependent upon the size (and presumptively, therefore, the di-

versity) of the population represented. 270 Whatever the merits of
the entire concept of democracy." Id. at 45. The argument ignores the role
played by a host of anti-majoritarian devices in managing conflict among
various groups in the society. The "people of a locality" -are not, after all,
the monolithic entity which the phrase implies. See Lucas, Book Review, 27
U. Cmi. L. REv. 791 (1960).

269. See, e.g., CHICAGO Holm RumE CoMM'N, MODNIZINo A Cnvr Gov282-83 (1954). The argument that general limitations upon governmental power are adequate protection against majority excesses at the
local level rests on the assumption that all important community values are
embodied in the constitution. Thus, the Chicago Home Rule Commission
has urged that in view of the constitutional guarantees which surround the
police power, there is little justification for a legislative policy narrowly dcining the scope of municipal licensing power. Ibid. Excessive use of the licensing power, however, represents a threat not only to individual freedom, for
which there may be constitutional protection, but also to the maintenance
of commercial competition, a generally accepted and important community
value for which constitutional protection is lacking.
270. Cf. Mishkin, supra note 249, at 4. I am unaware of any decisions
which explicitly adopt such an analysis, although there are occasional indications that courts are influenced by such considerations. E.g., compare State
ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. McKelvey, 301 Mo. 1, 256 S.W. 474 (1923),
with Oliver Cadillac Co. v. Christopher, 317 Mo. 1179, 298 S.W. 720 (1927).
ln the former case, the court invalidated a municipal zoning ordinance enacted pursuant to home rule powers as a "taking" of private property withERNMENT
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such an approach in other contexts12 71 it seems to offer no advan-

tages over a formulation of home rule powers which permits
courts to deny municipalities certain powers in the absence of
enabling legislation.
The questions stated in the previous paragraph suggest a more
basic inquiry, whether it is desirable, by a broad grant of power to
municipalities, to permit local majorities to press hard against fundamental values. Constitutional limitations, after all, are normally
considered to mark only the outer limits of government power, not
to define its optimum degree of exercise. The "common-law" doctrine that municipalities are limited to the exercise of delegated
power appears to be grounded on just such considerations. Judge
Dillon, for example, defended the "common-law" doctrine72 - by
reliance upon the opinion of Chief Justice Shaw in Spaulding v.
City of Lowell:
In aggregate corporations, as a general rule, the act and will of a
majority is deemed in law the act and will of 'the whole,-as the act
of the corporate "body. The consequence is that a minority must be
bound not only without, but against, their consent. Such an obligation
may extend to every onerous duty, to pay money to an unlimited
amount, to perform services,-to surrender lands, and the like. It is
obvious, therefore, that if this liability were to extend to unlimited
and indefinite objects, the citizen, by being a member of a corporation,
might be deprived of his most valuable personal rights and liberties.
The security against this danger is in a steady adherence to the principle stated, viz., that corporations can only exercise ther powers over
their respective members, for the accomplishment of limited and defined objects.

73

out just compensation. The latter decision, only four years later, upheld
against an identical attack a similar ordinance enacted pursuant to state
enabling legislation. Bassett concludes that cities were in the main unsuccessful in their efforts to base zoning upon home rule powers and that the
power to zone was confirmed only after the adoption of state enabling legislation. BASSETT, ZONInG 14-17 (1940).
271. See note 284 infra.
272. 1 DagoN, MuNiciPAL CORPORATIONS §§ 237--39 (Sth ed. 1911).
273. 40 afs. (23 Pick.) 71, 75 (1839). (Emphasis added in 1 DnmoN;, op.
cit. supra note 272, § 238, at 451.)
Additional insight into -the purpose of limiting municipal power is provided by a generally ignored portion of Judge Dillon's discussion of the construction of delegated municipal powers. "The rule of strict construction,"
according to Judge Dillon, "is . . . [primarily] applicable to grants of powers
to municipal and public bodies which are out of the usual range, or which
grant franchises, or rights of that nature, or which may result in public burdens, or which, in -theirexercise, touch the right to liberty or property, or as
it may be compendiously expressed, any common-law right of the citizen or
inhabitant." 1 DrgoN, op. cit. supra note 272, § 239, at 452-53. One need
not agree with the desirability of strict construction with respect to each of
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Quite obviously, these considerations collide with the persuasive
arguments previously examined 274 for conferring home rule powers in broad terms. On the one hand, municipalities require a
broad range of powers and a flexibility which cannot be achieved
through frequent trips to the state capitol for precise enabling
legislation. On the other hand, the possession of such power by
local majorities may threaten fundamental values. The dilemma
is not likely ever to be fully resolved. The ultimate values of
the modern democratic society, as Ylvisaker has written, "are
compatible, but only if tempered, not maximized.' 275
One method of accommodating these competing values is that
recommended by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations and adopted in the model provisions: a constitutional
grant of municipal initiative coextensive with the power of the
legislature, but subject to legislative limitation. 270 This method

provides the broad range of powers required by municipalities,
yet permits the legislature to guard against local action inconsistent with basic community values. Nevertheless, exclusive reliance upon the legislature is no more satisfactory here than it is
in providing protection against the extraterritorial impact of intramural legislation. The area of possible municipal action is so
broad, the range of potential experimentation so great, that the
ability of the legislature to foresee all of the problems which may
arise is highly improbable. Nor can reliance be placed upon legislative action after the exercise of municipal initiative. The relatively narrow impact of many local measures may not arouse
sufficient general interest to overcome legislative inertia. Exclusive reliance upon the legislature also involves the twin risks
suggested previously: On the one hand, a local majority, not
representative of the larger community, may force constitutional
decisions restrictive of individual freedom or contrary to minority
interests; on the other hand, precedent may be established which
will impede governmental action if the time comes that the legislature determines the necessity for the interference with individual or minority interests.
the powers listed. During the past half century there have been marked
changes in the responsibilities of municipalities and in public and judicial
acceptance of governmental power. The critical point is the implicit rejection
of the municipal council as an appropriate agency for experimentation with
deeply rooted values and the explicit use of judicial authority to limit municipal power as a device for protecting such values against threatening
municipal action.
274. See text accompanying notes 3,-62 supra.
275. Ylvisaker, supra note 266, at 33.
276. See -text accompanying notes 172-73 & 189-90 supra.
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A more satisfactory accommodation of the competing values
might be achieved by a broad but not unlimited grant of municipal initiative, in terms similar to those currently employed in
most state constitutions 7 7 Such a formulation of municipal power would permit the courts to consider the appropriate limits of
municipal power without simultaneously defining the boundaries
of governmental power generally. A decision limiting municipal
power would operate only as a suspensive veto, providing an opportunity for legislative consideration. The desirability of this
approach turns, of course, upon the tests employed by the courts
in determining the limits of municipal power in the absence of
express legislative delegation. If municipal power is too narrowly
restricted, the benefits of judicial review may not be worth the
price. Similarly, determination of the limits of municipal initiative
on the basis of an artificial "local affairs-general concern" test,
even if "local affairs" are broadly construed, is of questionable
value, not only because of its failure to recognize the necessity
for municipal power to govern generally,2 7 8 but also because it is
not responsive to the underlying reasons for judicial participation
in the process of defining the scope of municipal power, the potential inadequacy of political processes at the municipal level to
protect basic community values.
A more useful approach -one which recognizes the essential
policy components of the issue before the courts - is suggested by
an early Minnesota decision, State ex TeZ. Peers v. Fitzgerald.2
Acting under its home rule charter, the city of Virginia held Peers
in contempt for refusal to produce certain documents which the
council had subpoenaed in the course of an investigation. On
appeal from an order discharging a writ of habeas corpus, the
Minnesota Supreme Court invalidated a provision in the city's
charter which authorized the council to punish for contempt. That
power, the court reasoned, was subject to serious abuse and might
be "readily converted into an instrument of oppression."2 10 It was,
in addition, in potential conflict with traditional guarantees of
fair procedure, particularly in the hands of "persons of limited
legal knowledge and experience." 8 The dangers posed by the
contempt power were sufficiently great that courts in other jurisdictions were divided even on the question of whether the legislature could validly delegate the power to a municipal council.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See text accompanying notes 63-76 supra.
See text accompanying notes 34-62 supra.
131 Mfim. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915).
Id. at 10, 154 N.W. at 752.

281. Ibid.
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In Minnesota, the legislature had carefully circumscribed both
its own and the judiciary's contempt power by prescribing what
conduct constituted contempt, the procedure to be employed
in adjudicating contempt, and maximum punishments. Accordingly, the court held that even after the grant of home rule the
power of a municipal council to punish for contempt continued
to be dependent upon express authorization by the legislature.282
The Peers decision obviously involved judicial interference in
the "internal" affairs of a municipality. Justification for that interference is to be found in the protection of values deeply imbedded in the legal system and, in this instance, in legislative
policies embodied in statutes which, although not directly applicable to the case at hand, were plainly relevant to a determination of the propriety of the power asserted by the municipality.
Since the charter-making power of Minnesota municipalities was
based upon a statute, the court was able to rest its decision upon
282. The Peers decision has been criticized, with some justification, because of the court's failure to take account of relevant state legislation.
Anderson, Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 M1 x. L. REv. 306, 816-18
(1923). Professor Anderson points out that the statute conferring home rule
power upon Minnesota municipalities stated that charters might "provide
for the establishment and administration of all departments of a city government and for the regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as
the legislature might 'have done" prior to adoption of the home rule amendment to the state constitution. Minn. Laws 1895, ch. 8, at 124. The statute
is -ambiguous, however, in failing to make 'clear whether the legislature intended that home rule municipalities be permitted to exercise any power
which a legislature might delegate to a non-home rule municipality or only
that home rule municipalities were to have such freedom with respect to
"local municipal functions," with the courts free to determine which functions
were not "local" and "municipal." Professor Anderson's apparent approval
of the alternative ground of decision in Peers, that it is not a municipal function to aid in the enforcement of state anti-monopoly legislation, indicates
his acceptance of the latter interpretation. Other Minnesota decisions suggest
that the state supreme court has implicitly adopted the same interpretation.
See cases cited note 76 supra. On the assumption that the legislation did
leave the court free to determine which functions are "local" and "municipal,"
there was ample justification, as the text attempts to demonstrate, for a
conclusion that the council's power to punish for contempt in aid of an investigation was not within the initiative.
Other legislation ignored by the court casts more serious doubt on the
correctness of the court's conclusion. Professor Anderson notes that the legislature expressly conferred the power to punish for contempt upon city councils in a general act for the incorporation of cities enacted some years earlier.
A legislative judgment that the power might appropriately be conferred upon
municipalities, although not directly applicable to the municipality involved,
should have led the court to hold the power within the initiative conferred
by -the grant of home rule. See text accompanying note 285 infra. The Peers
court seems, however, to have been unaware of the enabling legislation.
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the presumed "intent" of the legislature. In jurisdictions where
charter-making authority flows directly from the constitution,
judicial reliance upon the "intent" of the legislature is not possible. Except in Alaska,21s however, there appears to be no textual
obstacle to reading the constitutional provisions as permitting
the courts to limit municipal initiative so as to preclude a use
of municipal power which threatens fundamental community
values or established state policies. Either in terms or by construction constitutional home rule provisions authorize municipal
action only with respect to "local" or "municipal" affairs. A use
of governmental power which threatens fundamental values or
established state policies might not be deemed a "local" or "municipal" affair for much the same reason that municipal regulations with too great an extraterritorial impact are not considered
to be "locar' or "municipal" affairs, the inadequacy of political4
processes at the municipal level to cope with such problems.c
Judicial power to invalidate municipal legislation inconsistent
with deeply rooted community values may be objected to on
the ground that, in practice, it is likely to prove too restrictive
of municipal power. Several arguments may be advanced in support of this position: First, the role suggested for the courts
places too heavy reliance on the ability of judges to identify those
283. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
284. If courts are to base limitation of the initiative on such considerations, it seems desirable to recognize that not all municipalities entitled to
exercise home rule powers are the same size. A generation ago, Professor
McGoldrick objected to the failure of courts to distinguish between large and
small municipalities. See McGoLDmucK, Tim LAw A-%D PRACTicE OF MuxIcIPAL
HoimE RuLE 1916-1930, at 311 (1933). Although his statement accurately
describes what courts have done, there appears to be no inherent reason, as
McGoldrick seems to have believed, why courts should not take population
into account when it is a relevant consideration. The argument that judicial
limitation of the initiative is necessary because of the greater risk of majority
excesses at the local level is obviously far less persuasive when applied to New
York, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and other major cities than it is in connection with smaller municipalities. Courts might, accordingly, adopt a variable
standard in determining the limits of municipal initiative under which the
weight given a legislative judgment would be partially dependent upon the
size (and presumptively, therefore, the diversity) of the population represented. Of. Mlfishkin, supra note 249, at 4. Charter provisions or ordinances
adopted by the largest cities, with a population in excess of that of many
states, should arguably be tested only by the same constitutional standards
which limit the power of the legislature. On the other hand, even the largest

cities do not contain a cross-section of -the entire population. See note 263
.supra. If, as I have argued, experimentation with basic values ought to be

based upon a consensus among the widest population possible, an equivalence
should not be drawn between even such cities and the state legislature.
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community values which are so fundamental that they ought to
be protected against inconsistent local action. Secondly, almost
every controversial exercise of municipal power, including many
generally accepted municipal powers, will to some extent threaten

important community values. If the municipal council is not permitted to choose between the values furthered by its attempted
exercise of power and other values arguably threatened by it,
there is little substance to the grant of municipal initiative. Finally, the fundamental values of the community are not static;
they are in a process of evolution. Unlimited municipal initiative
permits experimentation in the accommodation of competing

values without committing the entire state to a particular choice.
Each of these arguments has merit, but the second seems less
persuasive than either of the others. If the courts give appropriate recognition to the reasons for judicial participation in the
process of defining the scope of municipal initiative, there is not
likely to be a substantial curtailment of municipal power. Municipalities should retain a wide latitude of choice, since the justification for permitting courts to limit municipal initiative more
narrowly than legislative initiative, that precipitate majority action inconsistent with basic values is more likely to occur in less
populous and diversified communities, suggests an obvious limitation on the power of the courts to limit municipal initiative:
Judicial power should be exercised only to invalidate a novel
exercise of municipal power inconsistent with basic community
values. If the power asserted by the municipality has, for example, been conferred upon other municipalities by the legislature
or if a large number of other municipalities has exercised the
initiative in a similar manner, there is little justification for judicial intervention (except, of course, on constitutional grounds).
In these situations, there is somewhat greater assurance of effective representation of a variety of interests; accordingly, there
is less danger that minority interests will have been ignored by
a majority motivated by a single interest.28 5
285. Early attempts to base zoning upon home rule power, as indicated
in note 270 supra, -were generally rebuffed by the courts. There is some evidence that judicial unwillingness to permit municipalities to employ the initiative as authority for novel legislation threatening to basic values contributed
to the result. Thus, in Clements v. McCabe, 210 Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722
(1920), the court refused to sustain a zoning ordinance as an exercise of home
rule power. The grant could not, the court said, be extended to a power of
"such unusual scope and far-reaching possibilities as the yet in many respects
debatable police power sought to be exercised in the proposed zoning plan."
Id. at 217, 177 N.W. at 725. The analysis in the text suggests that the widespread acceptance of zoning in the year following the decision in Clements v.

1964]

HOME RULE

The exercise of judicial power to invalidate novel uses of municipal power which threaten important values does, however,
necessarily collide with the "little laboratory" argument for unlimited municipal initiative, the argument that it is desirable to
permit experimentation at the local level, thereby avoiding the
necessity of involving the welfare of the entire state. Perhaps a
sufficient 'answer to this argument is that enabling legislation
would also permit experimentation, but with the added benefit of
increased political safeguards for those whose interests may be
adversely affected by the experiment. In any event, the proposal
is not that all experimentation via the initiative be invalidated,
but only'such novel uses of municipal power as seriously
threaten- important values. That should leave municipalities a
good deal-of freedom. To the extent that it limits municipal freedom, -a choice must be made between the benefits which are
likely to accrue from such experimentation and the dangers which
it poses. The choice cannot, obviously, be made in the abstract.
Each of the constitutional restrictions on the power of all government represents a choice against experimentation, yet few would
argue that municipalities ought to be exempt from their coverage. It follows-that the conclusion that home rule municipalities
should be allowed to exercise unlimited initiative rests primarily
on the argument that courts ought not to be entrusted with the
responsibility of identifying those values which are so basic that
legislation inconsistent with them ought to be based on a consensus among a broader segment of the community than is found
at the local level. Where agreement as to basic values exists, as
with the constitutional restrictions upon the power of all government, municipal experimentation is prohibited.
Although judges empowered to invalidate an assertion of
municipal power on the ground of its inconsistency with basic
values would have considerable leeway, meaningful standards to
guide decisions are not lacking. The analogy to constitutional
restrictions on the power of all government suggests a starting
point for the identification of those values which ought to be
held beyond municipal initiative. Novel municipal legislation
which seriously threatens the values embodied in the constitutional restrictions should be invalidated on the ground that such
legislation is beyond the scope of municipal initiative. A decision
that the legislation would be unconstitutional if enacted or auMcCabe.should lead the courts to conclude that authority to zone (but not
necessarily every use made of the authority) may now be based on the grant
of home rule. Recent decisions appear to support that conclusion. See note
247 &upra.
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thorized by the legislature is, of course, unnecessary. Indeed,
avoidance of constitutional questions is a primary purpose of
permitting courts to invalidate an exercise of municipal power
on the ground that it goes beyond the initiative conferred by a
grant of home rule.2s If the power asserted by the municipality
raises a substantial constitutional question, there is adequate
basis for concluding that it has exceeded the permissible range
of municipal power in the absence of enabling legislation. Even
if the constitutional question is not substantial- in the sense
of being debatable - a serious threat to constitutional values
might reasonably serve as a basis for limitation of the initiative.
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision in Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago,28 7 for example, a court might distinguish
between a motion picture licensing ordinance and an ordinance
imposing a penalty upon the exhibition of obscene motion pic2 88
tures. The relative infrequency of the former type of ordinance,
historical aversion to licensing as a technique for controlling expression, and the major threat to values embodied in constitutional guarantees of free expression might lead a court to conclude that power to enact such an ordinance should depend upon
a consensus among the most representative body in the state.
Although an ordinance imposing penalties upon the exhibition
of obscene motion pictures may also threaten the policy of free
expression, the greater procedural safeguards of such a provision
and the comparatively lesser threat which, consequently, it poses
to constitutional values should lead a court to permit its adoption
as an exercise of the initiative, particularly since the frequency
of such legislation indicates a broad consensus that it represents
an appropriate balance of the competing community interests
in controlling obscenity and freedom of expression.
In the absence of a threat to values identified in the constitution, judicial participation in the process of defining the scope
of municipal initiative should be extremely limited. Not all community values are constitutionally protected, of course, but it
seems reasonable to assume that the values which are so identified are those to which the community accords the highest priority. Judicial intervention on their behalf, consequently, has a
stronger justification than exists for judicial protection of values
which are not so identified. Nevertheless, cases may arise in
which judicial protection of these latter values is warranted.
Municipal enactment of private law, for example, may seriously
286. See text accompanying note 269 supra.

287. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
288. See Brief for the Motion Picture Ass'n of America, Inc. as Amicus
Curiae, p. 4, Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
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disturb legal relationships created by general law without materially advancing the interests of the municipality.28 The selfinterest of a municipality may lead to adoption of regulations
governing its liability which are substantially at variance with
commonly accepted standards of fairness.: 0 No purpose would
be served by an attempt to list all of the situations in which
judicial intervention would be warranted; inability to foresee all
of the situations is the major justification for judicial review of
the exercise of municipal power. Nor does it seem feasible to define precise standards for determining those values which are
sufficiently important that novel municipal legislation which
seriously threatens them should be invalidated as beyond the
initiative. Identification of those values would require the courts
to draw on the sources which courts customarily employ in fashioning legal doctrines. As in Peers, substantial guidance might be
provided by state legislation which, though not controlling, identifies the values and indicates the weight accorded them by the
2 91
legislature.
Inevitably, the role suggested for the courts requires the exercise of judgment- and self-restraint- on their part. The argument that judges ought not to be entrusted with the responsibility
of identifying basic values, however, is not lacking in irony in
view of their generally accepted power to invalidate legislation
on constitutional grounds. A community which trusts its judges
to review all legislation for consistency with the constitution confers no greater power on them by authorizing the invalidation of
novel municipal powers inconsistent with basic values, whatever
the ambiguity of that phrase. True, the power of constitutional
adjudication is to some extent circumscribed by the language of
the constitution and the course of constitutional history, but most
lawyers recognize that in determining the validity of legislation
courts exercise a wider latitude of choice than is implied in Justice
Robert's dictum that courts need only "lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged
and . . .decide whether the latter squares with the former."-' 2
Moreover, if the range of judicial choice is narrower in constitutional adjudication than in the suggested judicial review of municipal initiative, it is also true that the consequences of a decision
limiting legislative power are far greater than the consequences
of a limitation of municipal initiative.9 3
289. See text accompanying notes 122-44 supra.

290.
291.
292.
293.

See text accompanying notes 115-21 supra.
Cf. Browne v. City of New York, 241 N.Y. 96, 149 N.E. 211 (1025).
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
See text accompanying notes 183-88 supra.

